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INTRODUCTION
Police officers rely on drug courier profiles1 to justify stopping and
questioning citizens about whether they are carrying illegal drugs. A
nationally recognized profile does not exist; federal, state, local, and
even individual law enforcement officials may have their own
"profile."' Citizens easily may match one of these profiles, because
the profiles list general and often contradictory characteristics:
traveling by plane, train, automobile, or bus; traveling alone, with
friends, or with your children; being young, middle-aged, or "older";
having short or long hair; traveling to or from Fort Lauderdale,
Miami, New York, Los Angeles, San Diego, Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit,
Austin, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Charlotte, Dayton, Indianapolis,
Kansas City, Newark, Tulsa, Dallas-Fort Worth, or any foreign country;
traveling in a business suit, casual clothes, or disheveled clothing;
paying cash for your ticket; traveling without checking your luggage,
carrying only a garment bag, or checking several large suitcases;
traveling and returning home in twenty-four to forty-eight hours;
being nervous or anxious when traveling; glancing around the airport,
bus, or train terminal; looking over your shoulder; making telephone
calls immediately after arriving at your destination; and taking public
1. The "drug courier profile" has been defined as an investigative tool used by Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agents to identify and to apprehend drug couriers. It generally
is attributed to Paul Markonni, a DEA agent who created the profile when he was assigned to
a drug interception unit at the Detroit Airport. It consists of a list of identifying characteristics
or behaviors that law enforcement officials associate with drug couriers. See Morgan Cloud,
Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative
Formulas, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 843, 847 (1985) (describing development and origin of drug courier
profile). No single, nationally recognized "profile" exists. The first drug courier profile case,
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), listed the following characteristics
to be used to identify a drug courier. (1) the use of small denominations of currency for ticket
purchases; (2) travel to and from major drug import centers, especially for short periods of time;
and (3) the absence of luggage or use of empty suitcases on trips that normally require extra
clothing;, and (4) travel under an alias. See id. at 538. It is apparent from examining case law,
however, that the drug courier profile characteristics have expanded well beyond this already
expansive list. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (approving profile-based
questioning of bus passengers); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1995) (articulating
profile characteristics for automobiles); United States v. Castaneda-Sandoval, No. 93-10349, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 6442, at *4 (9th Cir, Mar. 31, 1994) (excluding as "highly prejudicial" evidence
that defendant met drug courier profile by being calm and by traveling with children); State v.
Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994) (describing profile characteristics for Amtrak
passengers); see also Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That th' Infected
Spy, AsAULooks Yellow to theJaundic'dEye", 65 N.C. L. REv. 417,439-44 (1987) (describing profile
factors relating to: nervousness; source, use, transshipment, hub, and cross-road cities; travel
companions; race; age; attire; luggage; and miscellaneous possessions and behaviors).
2. See Becton, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that individual officers may have multiple
profiles of their own).
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transportation to your destination.' If any of these characteristics
match you and your travel habits, you may well fit a version of the
drug courier profile. Of course, matching a profile does not mean
that you are a drug courier.'
Imagine the following scenario: You are traveling and are stopped
by police because you match a profile. They request permission to
search your bags, or the interior or trunk of your car or truck.
Knowing you have nothing to hide, you give consent. To your
surprise, you are arrested for carrying illegal drugs. Incredible? Not
really!5 What is incredible is what may happen next. After being
3. See id. at 430-31 (discussing drug courier profile characteristics).
4. The DEA does not keep statistics that include the number of people whom police
stopped and questioned but who were not drug couriers. See i& at 418. In fact, the DEA does
not keep any uniform statistics that would clarify how many people are stopped and are found
to possess drugs. See id.
The author of this Article knows from experience how inaccurate profile use can be. Several
years ago, I was stopped by DEA agents at the Ontario Airport in California. I was taking a flight
from Atlanta to San Diego, with a 20-minute layover at the small Ontario Airport that is 20 air
minutes from San Diego. I was on my way to an interview at a university in San Diego. I was
wearing shorts, a t-shirt, and loafers. My hair was medium length, and I had a day's growth of
beard.
During the layover, I left the plane without any luggage and immediately went to a pay phone
to call my fiancde in Atlanta. When I tried to reboard the plane, I was confronted by three
undercover DEA agents who said they suspected me of transporting narcotics. They requested
to see my ticket and my identification. A cold chill ran down my spine as my imagination
quickly flirted with many thoughts. I gave them my ticket and my identification and asked why
they suspected me. I was told that they could not reveal such information. I then explained
that I was a lawyer who was very familiar with the drug courier profile, and in fact, had litigated
a case in which Paul Markonni (the originator of the profile) was involved. At that point, the
agents admitted they were curious, because I carried no luggage when I left the plane. I
explained that it was a short layover and that I was continuing on to San Diego. They eventually
were satisfied and allowed me to reboard the plane. No search took place. The incident lasted
approximately 10 minutes and I almost missed the flight.
A notorious example of a drug courier profile applied to an automobile stop was the basis
for a civil rights action against Eagle County, Colorado, that settled out of court last year for
$800,000. On May 3, 1989,Jhenita Whitfield and her sisterJanet were traveling to Denver from
San Diego with four children under age 2. They were stopped and left to stand with their
children while cars whizzed past at 65 miles per hour along 1-70 as their cars were searched.
Eagle sheriffs deputies found nothing. See Chet Whye, Eagle County Drug Busts Don't Offset
Collateral Damage to Rights, DENY. POST, Nov. 16, 1995, at B13.
5. There is ample reason to ponder whether all people caught possessing drugs are indeed
drug couriers or dealers. SeeAIan Dershowitz, Edwin Meese Encourages Police Perjury, BuFF. NEWS,
Aug. 30, 1995, at B3. Professor Dershowitz explains: "The public is finally learning the extent
of police perjury and evidence tampering around the country. In Philadelphia, several police
officers have admitted planting drugs in the homes of innocent citizens. In NewYork City, more
than a dozen policemen have admitted to committing perjury while testifying against
defendants." Id.; see also Stephen Braun, Confessions of Corrupt Cops Triggers Unrest in Philly, DET.
NEWS, Oct. 29, 1995, at A6 ("Indicted last February by a federal grand jury for violating the civil
rights of more than 40 Philadelphia residents and stealing more than $100,000 in cash and
property, 6 officers have pleaded guilty and will be sentenced soon.").
A Scottish newspaper reports:
Last week an unsuspecting American university professor, en route from Helsinki to
Orlando via Amsterdam's Schipol Airport, discovered, when he got to Florida, that the
Dutch military police had planted explosives in his suitcase to test security procedures.
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arrested, you begin to have hope; surely when you appear in court the
situation will be resolved favorably. You did not put drugs in your
luggage, you had no idea you were carrying them, and you certainly
had no intent to distribute them. However, the fact that you matched
a "drug courier profile" may be admitted as evidence to prove that
you must have known about the drugs, and, consequently, that you
did intend to distribute them.
Unfortunately security officers failed to find the bombs and the police forgot to take
them out, sending the hapless passenger on his way with explosives in his luggage. The
military police have now admitted that this is not the first time they have used
unwitting passengers at Schipol as guinea pigs.
Robin Pascoe, Potatoes Rocket, Bicycles Vanish and Democracy Rumbles On, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 27,
1995, at 11; see also Michelle Stevens, Utah Drug-Seizure Law Goes Too Far, Cm. SuN-TIMES, May
15, 1995, at 25 ("In Helper, Utah ... [u]nder a law in effect since Jan. 1 [1995], officers
involved in any drug seizure get to keep 12 percent of the proceeds. Critics says [sic] it gives
cops a license to steal. If nothing else, the law gives them an incentive to plant drugs on
innocent motorists.").
A Miami newspaper reports:
US DistrictJudge Federico Moreno awards $155,000 each to six passengers and crew
members of Belize Air International flight unwittingly involved in botched 1991 US
drug sting operation; five of six were jailed and tortured in Honduras as a result of
Drug Enforcement Administration planting cocaine on their jet; sixth jailed but not
beaten.
David Lyons, U.S. Must Pay for Botched Sting, Judge Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10, 1995, at B5.
In yet another example of an airport search,
British customs have been accused of planting drugs in the luggage of an innocent
Qantas passenger to test search procedures at London's Heathrow Airport.... When
he discovered the drugs, the [passenger] thought he was being set-up and telephoned
New Scotland Yard, which retrieved the cocaine and returned it to the embarrassed
customs officials.
Bill Perry, British Customs Accused in Drug Bungle UPI, Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File; see Cocaine Training Mix-Up, MIAMi HERALD, Aug. 19, 1994, at B2 ("U.S. Navy
stops secretly planting cocaine on private vehicles to train drug-sniffing dogs; action comes after
civilian aircraft electrician Paul Fifer unwittingly drove off with cocaine stashed on underside of
his truck at Pensacola Naval Air Station."); see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, No. 94-4006,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36677, at *6 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) (excluding proffered testimony that
drug dealers use unknowing travelers for cross-country drug transportation); United States v.
Osmani, 20 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that DEA agent admitted on cross-examination
that drug dealers sometimes use unknowing couriers); United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d
1331, 1333 (9th Cir. 1976) (excluding expert testimony of DEA agent that planting narcotics in
compartments in suitcases of unwary traveler was common scheme by smugglers to get drugs
into United States).
Sometimes, other people may have an incentive to plant drugs. Although not a profile case,
Debbie McCrary's story illustrates. Police arrived at McCrary's hotel room explaining they had
received a tip that she possessed guns and drugs. She allowed them to search the room. They
found nothing. Three days later, McCrary was stopped by police as she drove her van. They
explained they had received a tip that a van fitting the description of her van would be
transporting drugs. Again, knowing she had nothing to hide, Mcorary consented to a search.
Police found one half-pound of marijuana and a bag of prescription pills under the driver's seat.
McCrary was arrested. After being jailed for 14 days, the government dropped the charges
because there was insufficient proof that McCrary knew the drugs were there. Evidence
indicated that a jealous ex-boyfriend planted them in the van. SeeJill Taylor, Tip Firzzles; Van
Driver Goes Free, PALM BEACH Posr, Aug. 23, 1994, at B1.
DRUG COURIER PROFILE
This Article addresses serious issues raised by admitting drug
courier profile evidence at trial. It begins by briefly discussing the
drug courier profile in the Fourth Amendment context as a backdrop
for an examination and analysis of the use of such evidence at trial.
The profile has been challenged repeatedly in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.' Scholars have examined extensively several Supreme
Court decisions that arguably failed to establish adequate guidelines
for the government's use of profiles to justify investigative
detentions.7 Although profile use still is being challenged in the
Fourth Amendment arena, the recent use of profiles in trials of drug
cases is more disturbing. Prosecutors routinely attempt to elicit drug
courier profile testimony' from purported "expert" law enforcement
witnesses to bolster circumstantially substantive proof of guilt at trial.'
This Article analyzes both the majority view that drug courier
profile evidence is too prejudicial to be used to prove guilt,"° as well
6. See, e.g., infra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
7. See, eg., Carol M. Bast, The Pight of the Minority Motorist, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 49, 66-70
(1994) (concluding that Supreme Court has done little to protect motorists stopped because
they fit drug courier profile); Becton, supra note 1, at 454 (stating that Supreme Court's
decisions in drug courier profile cases has caused confusion in lower courts); Cloud, supra note
1, at 845 (criticizing Supreme Court for contradictory findings in construing use of drug courier
profiles); Tracey Maclin, The Decine of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 passim (1990) (arguing that Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment restricts right of locomotion); David Rudovsky, TheImpact of the War on Drugs
on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHL LEGAL F. 237, 240 (criticizing Supreme
Court for failing to uphold Fourth Amendment rights in drug-related cases); Stephen E. Hall,
Note, A BalancingApproach to the Constitutionality ofDrug CourierProfiles, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 1007,
1008 (contending that Supreme Court has failed to address adequately Fourth Amendment
concerns raised by use of drug courier profiles).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 650 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (overruling
objection to expert lawenforcement testimony regarding drug courier profile) The court quoted
the district court's statement regarding the admission of the expert testimony: "It's a pretty
generic run-of-the-mill sort of testimony from the agent .... It is expert testimony in terms of
what a lay jury would know, but in terms of the standard prosecution of drug cases, it is not
unusual evidence or testimony...."
9. Profile evidence usually provides circumstantial evidence of the elements of intent or
knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Castaneda-Sandoval, No. 93-10349, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
6442, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 1994) (ruling that government used drug courier profile evidence
impermissibly to prove Castaneda-Sandova must have known about drugs found in her car);
United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial court erred in
admitting expert testimony as substantive evidence to show that because defendant fit profile,
he must have intended to distribute cocaine in his possession).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1283 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that several courts
have held profile evidence inadmissible as substantive proof of guilt), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1867
(1996); United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that prejudicial
nature of profile evidence outweighs its probative value);Joner, 913 F.2d at 177 (holding that
profile evidence should not have been admitted as substantive evidence); United States v.
Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1989) (disapproving admission of profile testimony to
prove guilt); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989) (criticizing use
of criminal profiles as evidence of guilt in criminal trials); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas,
717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (denouncing use of drug courier profiles as substantive
evidence of guilt). The Tenth Circuit has avoided reviewing the issue on three separate
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as the substantial exceptions that have been created to justify
admission of this admittedly prejudicial evidence for background
evidence, rebuttal evidence, and explaination of modus operandi."
It next examines the Seventh Circuit's contradictory view, which
directly admits profile evidence to prove guilt.12 The Article com-
pares these conflicting views and shows that all circuits, in reality,
permit prejudicial profile evidence to reach the jury and to influence
the verdict.
Most importantly, this Article rejects the admission of drug courier
profile evidence at trial, except as rebuttal evidence." It demon-
strates that the admission of such evidence violates federal and state
character evidence rules' 4 in a manner that jeopardizes the funda-
mental fairness of the trial itself."i
occasions. See United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
classify evidence of gang affiliation as profile evidence); United States v.Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242,
1253 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding detective's testimony that drug dealers often use pagers too
limited to constitute profile evidence); United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1523 (10th
Cir. 1991) (reservingjudgment as to admissibility of drug courier profile evidence as substantive
proof of crime).
11. The exceptions for admission are analyzed in United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 847-48
(9th Cir. 1991). The exceptions include: impeachment or rebuttal evidence once the
defendant opens the door by using the profile to establish innocence based upon his or her
distinctions from the profile; explanation of modus operandi of complex drug-smuggling
conspiracies; and background evidence to explain the expertise of the testifying officer or to
explain why a stop was made. See id.; see also United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 501
(9th Cir. 1990) (allowing use of profile testimony as background evidence); United States v.
White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing expert testimony by officer of drug dealer's
modus operandi); Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1212-13 (permitting profile evidence in rebuttal).
12. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that profile
evidence can be admissible if it is relevant to element of crime at issue); United States v. Solis,
923 F.2d 548, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling profile evidence admissible as proof of intent to
distribute drugs); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 324 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding drug
courier profile evidence admissible if it is relevant to issue of defendant's guilt or innocence).
13. Criminal profile testimony may be used to rebut a defendant's attempt to prove
innocence by comparing the defendant to the typical profile and by highlighting the differences.
See, e.g., Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1212 (noting that Ninth Circuit previously had allowed
government to introduce otherwise excludable testimony on rebuttal when defendant opened
door by introducing testimony that could mislead jury).
14. This Article focuses primarily on federal case law. Many state court opinions, however,
also will be considered. Thirty-four states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
including- Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington,
and Wyoming. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 3 n.2 (2d ed. 1993).
15. See State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 1994) (finding use of drug courier
profile evidence analogous to character evidence and holding that admission of this improper
profile evidence, in conjunction with two other evidentiary errors, denied defendant fair trial).
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I. DRUG COURIER PROFILE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In an apparent attempt to examine the expansion of police
investigative practices, 6 the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a series of drug courier profile cases beginning in
1980.17 These decisions acknowledged the drug courier profile as a
legitimate, if somewhat imprecise, police investigatory device."8
Further, during the following decade, the Court determined that a
profile match is insufficient to create probable cause for an arrest. 19
The Court, however, never has decided whether the profile is
sufficient by itself to establish reasonable suspicion-a standard less
rigorous than probable cause-to detain a citizen under the Fourth
Amendment." In practice, police do stop and question citizens
when they match the drug courier profile.2' Officers generally assert
16. Seegenerally MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 (1975) (recognizing
that investigative questioning of suspicious persons in public places is standard police operating
procedure); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (3d ed. 1996) (describing scope of police
investigative practices).
17. The cases began with United States v. Mendenhagl 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and continued
through FHon'ida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). Althotigh not all of the cases have considered
directly the drug courier profile, they have had some impact on this area of law.
18. Compare United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) ("A court sitting to determine
the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to
that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow
detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent."), with id. at 13 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("In my view, a law enforcement officer's mechanistic application of a formula of
personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to detain can only dull the officer's ability and
determination to make sensitive and fact-specific inferences 'in light of his experience,'
particularly in ambiguous or borderline cases.") (citations omitted).
19. See Investigation Stops Using Drug Courier Profiles in INT'L AS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
TRAINING KEY No. 394, at 53, 55 (1988) ("This principle has been made crystal clear by the
courts; any attempt to arrest a drug courier based solely upon the use of a drug courier profile
will almost certainly result in all evidence being suppressed and the criminal charge being
dismissed.").
20. See Ornelas-Ledesma v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996) ("Articulating
precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible."). The
Maryland Court of Appeals predicted such indecision in Grant v. State 461 A.2d 524 (Md. Ct
App. 1983), stating-
[The] "drug courier profile". . . is a convenient descriptive term without a great deal
of significance. Some lament the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet told us
whether meeting the so-called 'drug courier profile' is an adequate predicate to
establish either reasonable suspicion for a stop or probable cause for an arrest or
search. Of course, the Supreme Court has not told us that and they never will.
Indeed, they cannot, for there is no such thing as a single drug courier profile; there
are infinite drug courier profiles. The very notion is protean, not monolithic.
ld. at 526.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 48 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
In these leading drug courier profile cases, like most of the cases discussed in this Article, citizen
detentions were justified by police because the citizen fit a profile.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:747
that a match establishes reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity is afoot.22
The first Supreme Court drug courier profile case, United States v.
Mendenhall,23 established the test for determining whether a limited
investigatory encounter by police rises to the level of a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality,24
stated: "[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred."25 A "seizure" occurs only when, "in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."2" Applying this test,
Justice Stewart concluded that Mendenhall had not been seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
27
Although the plurality opinion, by establishing the "free to leave"
test,28 did not address the drug courier profile, the concurring and
dissenting opinions explored the Fourth Amendment implications
surrounding the profile. Justice Powell, concurring, relied heavily
upon the experience of the police in detecting drug couriers through
use of the profile.29 He concluded that, assuming a Fourth Amend-
ment detention had occurred, the police had reasonable suspicion to
22. See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654-55 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that
police had testified at trial about defendant's match with profile to establish reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391,396 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that drug courier
profile can be used to establish reasonable suspicion for search and seizure).
23. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
24. Justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion, in which only one Justice joined completely.
Justice Powell wrote for three justices who concurred in part and concurred in the judgement;
four justices dissented.
25. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 (plurality opinion) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16 (1968)).
26. Id. at 554 (plurality opinion).
27. See id. at 547-49 (plurality opinion). Mendenhall was approached by two DEA agents
at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport who had observed that her conduct appeared "characteristic
of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics." Id. (plurality opinion). The agents approached her
as she was walking through the concourse and after identifying themselves as federal agents,
asked to see her identification and her airline ticket. There was a discrepancy between the
name on her driver's license and the name on the ticket. The agents returned her ticket and
driver's license, and one agent asked Mendenhall if she would accompany him to the airport
DEA office for further questioning. She agreed and consented to a search of her person and
her handbag. The body search revealed two packages containing heroin. See id. (plurality
opinion).
28. See id. at 554 (plurality opinion). For analysis suggesting that a reasonable person who
would feel free to walk away from police is a legal fiction, see Shawn V. Lewis, Note, Fourth
Amendment Protection Against Reasonable Seizures of the Person: The Intrusiveness of Dragnet Styled Drug
Sweeps, 82J. ClM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797, 818-21 (1992).
29. See Mendenha, 446 U.S. at 563-64 (plurality opinion).
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stop and question Mendenhall." Although his opinion seemed to
endorse the use of "drug courier profiles," Justice Powell stopped
short of complete validation. He stated that "reliance upon the 'drug
courier profile' [would not] necessarily demonstrate reasonable
suspicion. '"" ButJustice Powell stressed that the element of "reason-
ableness" in reasonable suspicion "need not ignore the considerable
expertise that law enforcement officials have gained from their special
training and experience," 2 thus indicating approval of the profile.
Four Justices dissented, expressing distrust of the drug courier
profile. 3 It was, no doubt, the diversity of opinion in Mendenhall
that led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a similar case only
a few months later.
In Reid v. Georgia,4 the Court directly addressed whether a
"drug courier profile" match provided police with reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop and question Reid. 5 The Court
30. See id. (plurality opinion) (noting that "trained law enforcement agent" may have
knowledge of methods used in recent criminal activity, characteristics of area, and behavior of
suspect apparently evading police contact and that they may see meaning in conduct or
circumstances that would seem innocent to untrained observer).
The factors that supported the reasonable suspicion in Mendezhall were: (1) Mendenhall
arrived in Detroit on an early morning flight from Los Angeles, a city believed to be a drug
source city; (2) she was the last person leaving the plane; (3) she appeared to be very nervous
and looked around the terminal area; (4) she did not claim any luggage at the baggage claim
area; and (5) she changed airlines for the flight out of Detroit. See id at 547 n.1 (plurality
opinion).
31. l& at 565 n.6 (plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion).
33. See id. at 573 n.II (WhiteJ, dissenting). Justice White contended that "Justice Powell's
conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting Ms. Mendenhail of criminal
activity relie(d] heavily on the assertion that the DEA agents 'acted pursuant to a well-planned,
and effective, federal law enforcement program.'" I. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting plurality
opinion at 565). Justice White charged that there was no evidence that the claimed successes
of the drug courier program were achieved through reliance on "nearly random" stops. He
pointed out that the statistics to whichJustice Powell cited to show the DetroitAirport program's
success "refer[red] to results of searches following stops 'based upgn information acquired from
the airline ticket agents, from [the agent's] independent police work,' and occasional tips, as
well as observations of behavior at the airport." Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
concluded that in this case, the DEA agents' suspicion of Ms. Mendenhall was based solely on
their observations of her conduct in the airport terminal. See id. (White, J, dissenting).
The statistics referred to in the dissent and upon whichJustice Powell relied, were as follows:
"During the first 18 months of the program, agents watching the Detroit Airport searched 141
persons in 96 encounters. They found controlled substances in 77 of the encounters and
arrested 122 persons." Id. at 562 (plurality opinion).
34. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
35. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam). Police observed Reid
exit an early morning plane arriving at Atlanta from Fort Lauderdale. Reid was carrying a
shoulder bag and was walking a short distance in front of a man carrying an identical shoulder
bag. Reid looked over his shoulder numerous times in the direction of the other man. The
second man caught up with Reid near the baggage claim area. They spoke and left the airport
together without claiming any luggage. As Reid and his companion left the airport terminal,
DEA agents stopped them and asked for their identification and their airline tickets. The agents
learned that the two men had stayed in Fort Lauderdale only one day. Both men became
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found, 6 as a matter of law, that the facts provided no reasonable
articulable suspicion to support the investigative stop:
The agent's belief that [Reid] and his companion were attempting
to conceal the fact that they were traveling together, a belief that
was more an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch"
than a fair inference in the light of [the agent's] experience, is
simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in this case. 7
The Court's opinion in Reid, although not explicitly rejecting the use
of a profile to establish articulable suspicion, retreated from the
implicit endorsement of its use in MendenhalL
Following Reid, the use of the profile and challenges to it proliferat-
ed, and the Court continued to revisit the issue. In Florida v. Royer,"8
the Supreme Court vacillated again. The Court's decision turned on
whether Royer was detained illegally when DEA agents confiscated
Royer's airplane ticket and identification, and took him with his
luggage to a small room at the airport for further questioning.
3 9
The Court held that the detention of Royer exceeded a consensual
encounter or investigatory stop.4" It determined that the agents'
nervous during the encounter. The agents then requested permission to search their bags.
Both men agreed but as they began to re-enter the terminal to go to a private room, Reid
dropped his bag and ran. The bag later was found to have cocaine in it. The agents justified
the stop by arguing that Reid fit the "drug courier profile." See id at 439-41.
36. Reidwas a per curiam decision, with three Justices concurring. The concurrence rested
on the fact that the lower courts assumed that a detention had occurred. The only issue,
therefore, was whether that assumed detention was supported by articulable suspicion. See id.
at 442-43.
37. I& at 441 (citations omitted).
38. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
39. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,501 (1983) (plurality opinion). Royer purchased an
airline ticket from Miami to New York with cash. His ticket was purchased using an alias and
he checked two suitcases with luggage tags having the same alias. As Royer proceeded to the
boarding gate, DEA agents stopped him because his characteristics appeared to match the drug
courier profile. The agents asked to see Royer's ticket and identification. It was not until this
encounter that the agents learned that Royer was using an alias. After checking Royer's ticket
and identification, the agents asked Royer to accompany them to a small room. The room was
described by one detective as "a large storage closet located in the stewardesses lounge" that
contained a desk and two chairs. Royer's ticket and his identification were not returned to him.
Furthermore, without Royer's consent, one agent retrieved Royer's luggage and brought it to
the room. Royer surrendered the keys to his luggage when the agents asked for consent to
search. Marijuana was found in Royer's luggage. See id at 493-95 (plurality opinion).
Royer's profile characteristics were as follows: (1) he was carrying heavy American Tourister
luggage; (2) he appeared to be between 25 and 35 years of age; (3) he was dressed casually; (4)
he appeared "pale and nervous, looking around at other people;" (5) he paid for his ticket with
a large number of bills; and (6) he wrote only a name and a destination on the airline baggage
identification tag, which had space for a name, address, and telephone number. See id. at 493
n.2 (plurality opinion). Royer challenged the search under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
495 (plurality opinion).
40. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion in which three Justices joined completely. See
i&. at 491 (plurality opinion). TwoJustices concurred, writing separate opinions. See i. at 508
(Powell,J., concurring); id. at 509 (Brennan,J., concurring). There were two separate dissents.
See id. at 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 519 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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conduct constituted a de facto arrest, which required probable
cause." Thus, the decision did not require analysis of whether use of
the profile justified an investigatory stop. However, addressing the
government's argument that the stop did not exceed an investigatory
detention supported by reasonable suspicion,42 the Court agreed that
reasonable suspicion existed,43 but-determined that the stop exceed-
ed investigatory detention.' The only suspicion of the DEA agents
that was noted by the Court was Royer's conduct allegedly fitting the
drug courier profile.4
After the decision in Royer, some Scholars strongly criticized the use
of the drug courier profile because of its lack of empirical validity. 6
As a result, some lower courts became more vigilant in reviewing
whether the drug courier profile permitted an investigatory stop. 7
Nonetheless, when the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1989,
the profile again survived scrutiny." In United States v. Sokolow,49
DEA agents justified a stop based on a profile match.5" The factors
prompting DEA agents to stop Sokolow were:
(1) he paid $2,100.00 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20
bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name
41. See id at 502-03 (plurality opinion) (concluding that Royer's detention was serious
enough to constitute arrest).
42. See id. (plurality opinion) (noting government's argument that reasonable, articulable
suspicion existed, and thus investigatory stop was justified).
43. See id. (plurality opinion) (finding that reasonable investigative detention was justified
when officers discovered petitioner was traveling under assumed name, paid cash for one-way
ticket, and exhibited suspicious behavior).
44. See id. (plurality opinion).
45. See id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
46. See Becton, supra note 1, at 470 (arguing that use of profile encourages "selective
enforcement and retroactive application" of evidence produced by search to reasonable
suspicion analysis); Cloud, supra note 1, at 920 (concluding that use of profiles permits searches
of individuals on basis of innocent facts, violating "central teaching" of Fourth Amendment that
individualized facts should be determinative).
47. See, e.g., Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,490 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Cloud, supra note
1, at 853-54); United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 655 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cloud, supra
note 1); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Cloud, supra note 1, at
848-49); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 369 S.E.2d 423,425 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Becton, supra
note 1, at 471).
48. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
49. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
50. See id. at 10 n.6. DEA agents were notified by an airline ticket agent of the cash
purchase of two tickets from Honolulu to Miami. This notification prompted the DEA to check
the call-back number provided by the purchaser. Neither the call-back number nor any other
number were listed under the. name of Andrew Kray, Sokolow's alias. Sokolow and his
companion, unaware of the investigation, flew to Miami. Later, the DEA was notified that return
reservations were made for three days later. The return flight had two scheduled stopovers, one
of which was in Los Angeles. Police in Los Angeles were notified, and they monitored Sokolow's
conduct. DEA agents in Los Angeles informed Honolulu DEA agents that Sokolow appeared
to be very nervous and was looking around the waiting area during the stopover in Los Angeles.
See id at 4-5.
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under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original
destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed
in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from
Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during
his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage.51
The Court concluded 52 that the conduct exhibited by Sokolow
provided reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigatory stop:
5" "A
court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must
require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion,
but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a
trained agent."5 4 Thus, Sokolow seemingly mandates that a person's
conduct be objectively suspicious in nature to justify an investigatory
detention; behavior that merely matches a profile list, with nothing
more, is not necessarily sufficient.5 Use of the profile, however, was
not condemned.
In oNrida v. Bostick,56 the Supreme Court revisited and extended
Mendenhall. In its simplest terms, the opinion in Bostick reiterates the
rule that police may question people and may request to search their
belongings without any articulable suspicion and without violating the
Fourth Amendment." The facts of Bostick, however, seem to stretch
the Mendenhall rule to new and questionable limits.5"
51. I& at 3.
52. Sokolow was a 7-2 decision with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority and
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissenting.
53. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11 (holding that agents had reasonable basis for suspecting that
respondent was carrying illegal drugs).
54. Id at 10.
55. See INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POUICE, supra note 19, at 55. One commentator explains:
In applying the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Sokolow, it is important to note that
the court did not state that the drug courier profile itself provided a sufficient basis for
the investigative stop of Sokolow in the Honolulu Airport. The Court held only that
the factors which were known to the DEA agents, and which led them to believe that
Sokolow fit the profile which they happened to be using, were in themselves sufficient
to constitute "reasonable suspicion" and tojustify the temporary detention of Sokolow
for farther investigation. The majority of the Court seemed to regard the fact that the
agents were using a profile as irrelevant; to the justices who voted to uphold the
conviction, it was apparently the circumstances themselves, not the existence or use of
a prepared profile, which constituted "reasonable suspicion." Presumably the result in
the case would have been the same even if a profile had not been involved.
Id.
56. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
57. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to 'disregard the police and go about
his business ....'" (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991))).
58. In Bostick, police officers entered a bus that was stopped temporarily at a bus terminal
as part of a drug interdiction program. Police requested to see Bostick's identification and
ticket, admittedly with no articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity.
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Reconsidering Mendenhall in the "bus context,"59 the Court
implied that Bostick, although perhaps not "free to leave" the bus,
6
0
was free to ignore the officer's request"1 The Court, however,
refused to hold that no seizure had occurred and remanded the case
for that determination.
62
Now, after the decade of decisions set forth above, the basic
question surrounding the drug courier profile still remains: Is it
merely an investigative device alerting police officers to question
certain individuals, or is it ajustification for forcible stops of citizens
that is constitutional only if officers have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity?
Commentators agree that this area of Fourth Amendmentjurispru-
dence is confusing.6 Given the ambiguity of Supreme Court
precedent, challenges to the use of profiles undoubtedly will contin-
ue.64 Although analysis of the validity of the drug courier profile in
Although the identification and ticket provided no additional reason for suspecting criminal
activity, the officers requested permission to search Bostick's luggage. Bostick denied that he
was advised he could withhold consent to the search, but the Court relied upon the trial
court's determination that consent had, indeed, been given. The officers searched the luggage
and found cocaine. See id. at 431-33.
59. Bostick was the first Supreme Court drug courier case that was not an "airport" case. It
was a 6-3 decision with Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting.
60. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435 (articulating Bostick's argument that there was nowhere to
go on bus to avoid police questioning, and that reasonable bus passenger would not have felt
free to disembark because he might have been stranded without his luggage).
61. See ia at 436 (finding that issue was whether "reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter"). For analysis suggesting
that the "reasonable person" in this Fourth Amendment context is a myth, see Thomas K.
Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 Am. CIM.
L. REV. 799, 834-40 (1991).
62. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (noting that officers did not point gun or otherwise threaten
Bostick, yet declining to decide whether seizure occurred).
63. See generally Thomas E. Baker, "The Right of the People to Be Secure . . ." Toward a
Metathemy of the Fourth Amendment 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881 (1989). For a provocative effort
to create such a metatheory and for criticism of that effort, compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994), with Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994).
64. For examples of continuing conflict in this area of law, see United States v. Jennings, No.
91-5942, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 926, at *13-14 (6th Cir.Jan. 13,1993) (noting officer's admission
that half of his airport stops are of either African-American or Hispanic individuals, although
they "comprise far less than fifty percent of the airline passengers," giving appearance that
officer's "reasons for stopping these individuals '[are] less likely to be inarticulable than
unspeakable'") (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 42 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting)); United States v.
Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1992) (reviewing numerous inconsistent cases analyzing
drug courier profile as basis for reasonable suspicion); United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578
(6th Cir. 1992) (finding no need to consider questions of whether surveillance of petitioner was
motivated by race or whether racial component to courier profile would violate individual's due
process or equal protection rights); and Gregory L. Young, The Role of Stereotyping in the
Development and Implementation of the D.E.A. Drug Courier Profiles, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 331,
335-49 (1991) (suggesting codification of specific profile characteristics to be used and standards
by which to implement them). Courier profile characteristics are of questionable usefulness as
an investigative tool. Most objectionable, however, is the use of such characteristics as race,
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence remains unresolved, prosecutors
now have stepped beyond Fourth Amendment challenges and are
presenting profile evidence to the jury. This Article examines this
emerging practice.
II. BEYOND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: DRUG COURIER PROFILE
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
The conflicting opinions about the drug courier profile in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence raise serious questions about whether
profile evidence ever should be used at trial.65 The Supreme Court
has not yet addressed this issue, although conflict exists among the
circuits."6 The majority rule is that drug courier profile evidence
may not be admitted as "substantive" evidence of guilt at trial.
67
These same circuits, however, allow profile evidence to reach the jury
by way of liberal exceptions that virtually have subsumed the purport-
ed rule.' These broad exceptions include admission of drug courier
profile evidence: (1) as background material to explain police
ethnicity, and appearance, which may be based on stereotypes. See id. at 338-39. Profiles also
are criticized as overly vague; the lack of set limits as to which characteristics may be used
engenders "a seemingly endless and everchanging set of criteria, which appear capable of
change to fit the traits of the suspects involved in each case." Id.
65. SeeBecton, supra note 1, at 454-59, 471 (analyzing inconsistency in drug courier profile
cases and concluding that courts should consider courier profiles only as administrative tools of
police); Cloud, supra note 1, at 861-73 (pointing out that Supreme Court has failed to articulate
consistent policy and has left central questions unanswered). Compare United States v.
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that most circuits view critically
the use of courier profiles), and United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (concluding that courier profile is merely administrative police tool, and that presence
or absence of any particular trait on profile is legally irrelevant to determination of reasonable
suspicion), with United States v. Caicedo, No. 95-3242, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13393, at *11-12
(6th Cir. June 6, 1996) (explaining Supreme Court's mandate to consider even innocent facts
in determination of reasonable suspicion).
66. The Supreme Court, however, has had numerous opportunities to address the issue.
Certiorari has been denied in several cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 965 (1993); United States v. Wilson, 930 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 872 (1991); United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 947 (1990); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1010 (1990); United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091
(1990).
67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. When drug courier profile evidence is admitted under a limited purpose exception over
objection, courts generally give limiting instructions to alleviate the acknowledged prejudicial
impact of such testimony. It is, of course, questionable whether such limiting instructions
achieve the goal of reducing prejudicial impact. For empirical studies of the efficacy of limiting
instructions, see Keri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 407 (1995); and Roselles L. Wissler &
MichaelJ. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: Wen Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence
to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 37 (1985). Both authors conclude that the instructions
are largely ineffective, particularly when the evidence goes to character.
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conduct in arresting the accused;69 (2) as foundation for police
expert opinions;7 (3) as background material to explain the modus
operandi of the drug trade;71 and (4) as rebuttal evidence against
the accused.72 The Seventh Circuit, taking a minority position,
admits profile evidence to prove guilt directly.7'
The following sections explore the weakening general rule with its
burgeoning exceptions and the Seventh Circuit minority position. In
addressing the courts' justifications for the admissibility of profile
evidence, this Article reveals that these decisions predispose jurors to
a conclusion of guilt by permitting flagrant violations of evidence
rules, thereby jeopardizing the reliability of the verdict, and, conse-
quently, the fundamental fairness of the trial.
A. The Majority: Profile Evidence Is Inadmissable as Substantive
Evidence of Guilt
Drug courier profile evidence sweeps so broadly as to include
innocent people as well as the guilty.74 In fact, most of the charac-
teristics included in such profiles are common to all travelers.
75
Thus, presentation of the profile prejudicially influences the jury by
identifying the defendant with an alleged drug dealer profile based
on characteristics that necessarily may not be indicative of criminal
69. See infra notes 104-31 and accompanying text; see also Gomee-Norena, 908 F.2d at 501;
Hermandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d at 555.
70. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ramirez-Garcia,
No. 93-50310, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12406, at *4 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994).
71. See infra notes 144-90 and accompanying text; see also Lir, 984F.2d at 335; United States
v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991).
72. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Carillo-De Molino,
No. 92-10025, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14856, at *10 (9th Cir. June 6, 1994); United States v.
Castaneda-Sandoval, No. 9-10349, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6442, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 1994);
Lirm, 984 F.2d at 335; United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1989).
73. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Solis, 923
F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316. 324 (7th Cir. 1989).
74. Se Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d at555 (finding that drug courier profiles are inherently
prejudicial due to potential for including innocent citizens). The Eleventh Circuit has held that
"[e]very defendant has the right to be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on
the techniques utilized by law enforcement officers in investigating criminal activity." Id.
75. See supra text accompanying note 3 (listing conflicting characteristics).
1997]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:747
activity.76 Consequently, the majority rule is that drug courier profile
evidence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
77
Substantive evidence of guilt generally is any evidence, either direct
or circumstantial, that helps prove an element of the crime
charged.7' A survey of federal circuit cases shows that the prevailing
interpretation of "substantive evidence" in the profile context is more
narrow; it is a direct comparison of generalized profile data With the
actual behavioral characteristics of the accused observed by police.
79
This interpretation has made it easy for the courts to admit profile
evidence through liberal exceptions, so long as no direct comparison
is made. Consequently, profile evidence routinely reaches the jury.
B. Exceptions for Admissability of Drug Courier Profile Evidence
The exceptions carved out for admission of drug profile evidence
have begun to overshadow the majority rule."° The following
76. See Hernandz-Cuartas, 717 F.2d at 555; see also State v. Walker, 891 P.2d 942, 948 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that use of drug courier profile evidence as evidence of guilt risks
conviction for others' criminal activity); People v. Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 841 (Ct. App.
1992) (rejecting car thief profile and holding that such profiles may be permissible investigatory
technique but are "inappropriate for consideration on the issue of guilt or innocence for the
very reason given in drug courier profile cases: the potential of including innocent people as
well as the guilty"); People v. Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that defendants have right to be tried by evidence against them, not by investigative techniques
of law enforcement officers); cf United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150, 162 & n.1 1 (C.M.A. 1992)
(analogizing sex offender profile to drug courier profile and explaining that "[t] he government
tactic was to use a simple syllogism (major premise, minor premise, and conclusion) to persuade
jury] members that appellant was a child abuser" (citing EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The "Bases"
of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988))).
Through expert testimony in Banks,
the government presented the major premise-families with the "profile" of the three
identified risk factors present an increased risk of child sexual abuse. Through lay or
expert testimony, the prosecution established the minor premise-appellant and his
family fit the profile . ... This led to the conclusion that appellant was a child
abuser-a conclusion argued by trial counsel based on the major and minor premises.
Id. at 162.
77. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
78. "Substantive evidence" is defined as "that adduced for the purpose of proving a fact in
issue, as opposed to evidence given for the purpose of discrediting a witness, or of corroborating
his testimony." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, No. 93-50310, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12406,
at *4 (11th Cir. May 25, 1994) (finding that officer's testimony describing similarities between
defendant and profile constitutes use of profile as substantive evidence of guilt); United States
v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[The agent] tied Lui's actions to a drug courier
profile for the purpose of proving Lui's guilt."); United States v.Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding that use of expert testimony to show defendant's similarity to profile was
used to prove guilt); United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding
point-by-point comparisons of defendant with profile to constitute use of profile as substantive
evidence of guilt).
80. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (describing existing exceptions and
explaining potential for juror misuse of profile evidence). Although courts have identified
three separate exceptions for admission of drug courier profile evidence, upon examination, it
becomes apparent that there is virtually no distinction in how the information is presented under
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sections examine how profile evidence is used under the exceptions.
This Article questions its admissibility, except when used as rebuttal
evidence.
1. Rebuttal evidence
All circuits allow the profile to be used as rebuttal evidence."
This use of the profile, similar to the right to rebut introduction of
good character traits, 8 2 is relevant when the defendant "opens the
door" by injecting the profile into the trial.8 3  When a defendant
presents evidence of his dissimilarity to the "typical drug courier" to
create the inference that he is innocent, therefore, the prosecutor
subsequently is permitted to introduce characteristics in the profile
that the defendant does match.84
The case cited most often for use of this exception is United States
v. Beltran-Rios.' The defendant was stopped by U.S. Customs agents
at a port of entry in California. 6 Beltran-Rios was transporting
heroin in his shoes.8 7 Beltran-Rios' defense was duress; he claimed
he transported the drugs against his will to protect his family.' In
the background and the modus operandi exceptions. The differing judicial classifications for
this testimony apparently were derived from the justification for its admission by the
prosecution.
81. Although some courts refer to rebuttal as impeachment evidence, this is a misnomer.
Profile evidence is offered almost exclusively under this exception after the defense cross-
examines the law enforcement officer and highlights dissimilarities between the defendant and
the profile. In rebuttal, the prosecution is permitted to re-direct the officer on profile
characteristics that the defendant did match. See, e.g., United States v. Castaneda-Sandoval, No.
93-10349, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6442, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 1994) (finding error in
prosecution's attempt to "impeach" defendant by offering profile evidence before defendant
"opened door" to it); United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331, 335 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
government's argument that defendant's testimony that he was innocent "opened door" to
admission of drug courier profile as rebuttal evidence, because profile evidence was introduced
in government's case-in-chief before defense introduced any evidence of defendant's behavior);
see also infra note 83 and accompanying text (describing when use of profile evidence is not
appropriate by the government).
82. SeeCHARLES T. MCCORMCK, MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE § 191 (John Williams Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (stating that once defendant introduces particular character traits to prove his
innocence, prosecution may use same traits, but only those traits, as rebuttal evidence in cross-
examination or direct testimony); infra notes 223-41 and accompanying text (providing analysis
that concludes profile evidence is character evidence).
83. See, &g., Castaneda-Sandoval 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6442, at *5-6 (finding that
government's use of profile evidence exceeded scope of defense's testimony and, therefore, fell
outside exception); Lim, 984 F.2d at 335 (ruling that admission of profile evidence was error,
because it was introduced before defendant had opportunity to "open door"); United States v.
Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (9th Gir. 1989) (allowing profile testimony to rebut
defendant's characterization of himself as "poor simple farmer").
84. See supra note 81 (discussing ability of prosecutor to elicit characteristics defendant
matched after defense introduced profile evidence).
85. 878 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1989).
86. See i at 1209.
87. See i&.
88. See id. at 1209-10.
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an effort to "raise an inference that Beltran-Rios was not a drug
courier because his lifestyle was inconsistent with that line of
business," 9 defense counsel portrayed Beltran-Rios as a poor farmer
who displayed no trappings of wealth associated with the drug
trade." In rebuttal, the prosecutor elicited testimony from law
enforcement agents that "mules91 were generally poor, sympathetic-
looking individuals, who went into the drug courier trade because it
is the only way for such individuals to make money quickly."
9"
Although recognizing the general rule that profile evidence is too
prejudicial to be used as substantive evidence of guilt,93 the court
held that it may be offered in rebuttal when the defendant "opens the
door by introducing potentially misleading testimony."94 The court
emphasized that this exception is a narrow one: "The government
may introduce profile testimony of this sort only to rebut specific
attempts by the defense to suggest innocence based on the particular
characteristics described in the profile."95
Rebuttal use of profile evidence is appropriate and firmly grounded
in our concept of a fair trial.9" Beltran-Rios' evidence could have
given the jury the false impression that only persons who appear
wealthy intend to import and distribute drugs. When offered by the
defense, such misleading evidence can influence unfairly the jury just
as much as when it is offered by the prosecution. 97 The rebuttal
exception, thus, is necessary to ensure confidence in the integrity of
the verdict.9" Furthermore, although profile evidence is inherently
89. Id at 1211.
90. See id at 1211-12.
91. A "mule" is a slang term used to refer to individuals who transport illegal narcotics. See
United States v. Botero-Ospina, No. 94-4006, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36677, at *6-7 (10th Cir.
Dec. 27, 1995). A "blind mule" is a slang term for an "unwitting" individual who has been
duped into transporting drugs unknowingly. See id.
92. See Belran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1210. The court, however, refused to allow the agent to
testify that mules are typically "older" because Beltran, who apparently was "older," did not
insinuate that he was too old to be a courier. See id. at 1210 n.1.
93. See id. at 1210-11.
94. IM at 1212.
95. Id. at 1212 n.2; see also United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (ruling that
expert testimony regarding drug practices of Pakistani heroin traffickers was relevant to rebut
defendant's attempt to prove his innocence by suggesting that he displayed no trappings of
wealth that large scale distributor might be expected to display).
96. "Our adversary system permits 'fighting fire with fire' to ensure a fair trial." United
States v. Banks, 36 MJ. 150, 164 n.15 (C.MA 1992) (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 82, § 57).
97. Cf State v. Parkinson, 909 P.2d 647, 650-51 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (holding that trial
court properly excluded defense's use of expert testimony on sex offender profiles to prove
innocence based on dissimilarities to profile, because such evidence "invades the province of the
jury and unfairly prejudices the prosecution").
98. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (explaining that requirement of
reasonable doubt further protects strong societal interest in reliability of verdicts).
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prejudicial,99 when the defendant invites erroneous use of the
testimony, he has no basis to claim unfair prejudice."°  Even this
appropriate theory of admission, however, can be applied inappropri-
ately.10'
2. Background evidence
Profile evidence is used in two ways as background evidence by
prosecutors at trial: (1) as background of the case; and (2) as training
99. See United States v. Carter, 901 F.2d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that profile
admissions are "inherently prejudicial and can easily influencejury into thinking that defendant
is guilty"); United States v. Hemandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that
profiles are "inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for including innocent
citizens as profiled drug couriers").
100. See United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine
of invited error prevents a defendant from complaining of an error that was his own fault.");
United States v. Segal, 852 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'invited error' doctrine entitles
the government to pursue inquiry into matter, if evidence thereon was first introduced by
defendant.").
101. See United States v. Wilson, 930 F.2d 616, 616 (8th Cir. 1991). In Wilson, the defendant
was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute when he picked up
a package containing the drugs at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. See id. at 617.
His defense was ignorance: He picked up the package for his boss and did not know what was
in it. See id. at 618. The prosecution offered evidence in its case-in-chief to show that Wilson
often traveled by plane between St. Paul and Phoenix, the source city of the package. The
prosecutor also made reference to the drug trafficker profile during his closing argument. See
id. The court permitted testimony "regarding the significance of flight duration, source cities,
and the like," and about the number of previous flights Wilson had taken. See Brief for
Appellant at 7, United States v. Wilson, 930 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-5176 MN) (citing
transcript). On appeal, the defendant argued:
The prosecutor relied upon [the profile evidence], and exaggerated its evidentiary
effect in closing argument. [He] discuss[ed] the defendant's frequent travel to
Arizona, the shortness of the trips, payment by cash, and last minute purchase of
tickets [and] concluded all of these fit the profile that [the officer] of the Airport
Narcotics Unit testified as consistent with people involved in narcotics trafficking.
Id. at 13. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the profile evidence was used properly to rebut
Wilson's ignorance defense. See Wilson, 930 F.2d at 618.
There is no indication in this case that Wilson ever attempted to prove his innocence by
showing his dissimilarity to the profile characteristics. He merely denied knowledge of the
package's content and explained the innocent reasons for his frequent travel to Arizona. See id.
Such testimony should not open the door to profile evidence. In this decision, the court
condoned the use of drug courier profile evidence not to rebut evidence but to rebut a not guilty
plea. The court's reasoning is particularly faulty because it admitted the testimony during the
government's case-in-chief. Thus, even this theoreticallywell-reasoned exception to the majority
rule can be abused.
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background of a testifying expert law enforcement agent.10
2 Each
will be addressed separately because they present different challenges.
a. Background of the case
Many courts that admit the profile as background evidence
conclude that the evidence merely places the arrest in context and
provides an explanation for the law enforcement officer's con-
duct. 3 Thus, in the view of these courts, profile evidence, in this
context, is not unduly prejudicial and does not amount to substantive
proof of guilt or innocence." United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas°5
is the leading opinion cited for this exception; however, this Eleventh
Circuit view is somewhat misleading.
In Hernandez-Cuartas, the defendant entered the United States from
Columbia through the Miami airport carrying several containers of
102. There is very little difference in how these types of background evidence are presented.
In both situations, law enforcement officers testify about the training they have received in the
use of drug courier profiles and list the characteristics they have been taught to look for. When
presenting the background of the case, profile evidence is presented as an introduction to the
facts surrounding the arrest of the defendant. An officer presenting this testimony need not be
qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In the expert opinion cases, the
officer is qualified as an expert under Rule 702 so that he can give opinions on the significance
of the defendant's behavior or about physical evidence in the case. His expertise is based
partially on his training in the use of drug courier profiles. Although quite similar, the two types
of background evidence are addressed separately because unique issues must be resolved when
profile evidence is used as the basis of an expert opinion.
103. See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497,501 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that trial
record reflected that district court judge warned jury to utilize testimony only for background
material concerning events that occurred on day defendant was arrested); United States v.
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (clarifying that testimony concerning
"drug profile was used for purely background material").
104. See United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1284 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to find plain error
for use of drug courier profile because evidence "was not central to the prosecution's proof of
guilt"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1967 (1996); United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, No. 93-50310, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 12406, at *3-4 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994) (holding that allowing government's use
of profile evidence as background information, to which defense did not object, was not plain
error); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1993) (intimating that testimony
concerning "typical behavior[ial] patterns characterizing both users and distributors" is
permissible as long as it provides background data); United States v. McDonald, 933 F. 2d 1579,
1522 (10th Cir. 1991) (validating use of drug courier profile to aidjury in relating relevance of
evidence); Gomu=-Norena, 908 F.2d at 501-02 (holding profile admissible because it providedjury
with "full and accurate portrayal of events as they unfolded.., and actually limited potential
for unfair prejudice"). But see United States v. Williams, 957 F. 2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding plain error when profile used not as background information, but as substantive proof
of guilt).
105. 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983). The Fourth Circuit, however, apparently credits
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), for this proposition. SeeUnited States v.Jones, 913
F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1990) (deciding that admission of profile evidence was abuse of trial
court's discretion because profile was not introduced as background information as in Sokolow,
but as substantive evidence); see also United States v. Bryant, No. 89-5754, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
20036, at *5 (4th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990) ("When the propriety of a stop or an arrest is not at issue,
such evidence may nevertheless be admitted as background information providing an agent's
basis of a stop or arrest.").
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coffee.1 6 At the first check-point, a customs agent noted that the
defendant had made four trips from Columbia in four months and
signaled for a second agent to examine closely her belongings. °"
At the second check-point, the second agent discovered cocaine in six
of the ten coffee containers.0" At trial, both customs agents testi-
fied about their training in using the drug courier profile and listed
characteristics they were taught drug couriers purportedly exhibit.10 9
Defense counsel failed to object to this line of questioning until the
agents began to compare the defendant's behavior to the profile. 0
Although the objection was overruled by the trial court, the prosecu-
tor rephrased the question in a manner that did not elicit a direct
comparison."' The defendant was convicted." 2
On appeal, Hernandez-Cuartas claimed that the general profile
testimony denied her a fair trial,"' and the court reviewed the
record for plain error."4 Finding it improper to use profile evi-
dence as substantive evidence of guilt,"5 the court noted that the
challenged testimony "was used purely for background material on
how and why Ms. Hernandez-Cuartas was stopped and searched by the
customs officers." 6  The conviction was affirmed."' The court's
ruling was a narrow one: Use of profile evidence to explain police
conduct in arresting a defendant does not amount to plain error.11 8
The court did not endorse the use of profile evidence in every
circumstance, however, explaining that the use of profile evidence in
this circumstance was permissible because "[t] he prejudicial effect of
the admission of this testimony was slight as was the probative value
106. See Hernanda-Cuartas, 717 F.2d at 553-54.
107. See Id. at 55-54.
108. See id. at 554.
109. See id. at 554 & n.1.
110. See id. It is apparent that defense counsel often fails to object to profile testimony. See
United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, No. 93-50310, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12406, at *4 (9th Cir. May
25, 1994) (reviewing admission of profile evidence for plain error when defense did not raise
specific objection during jury trial); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn. 1994)
(finding, sua sponte plain error in admission of profile despite failure of defense counsel to
make proper objections); see also infranotes 265-69 and accompanying text (discussing Wil/iams).
111. See Hen andeiz-Cuartas, 717 F.2d at 554 n.1.
112. Seeit Uat553.
113. See id. at 554.
114. See Id. at 555.
115. See id. (noting that drug courier profiles are inherently prejudicial because they are
likely to describe innocent people as drug couriers).
116. Id& The court asserted that the officer's testimony made it clear that a drug courier
profile was only a "preliminary consideration" in the decision to subject the defendant to a full
customs inspection. See id.
117. See id. at 556.
118. See id. at 555-56.
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because this evidence was not necessary or relevant to the charges
against the appellant."1 9
Relevant evidence, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is defined
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."12 ° It is undis-
puted that irrelevant evidence should not be admitted at trial.121 A
closer analysis of the court's assessment of profile background
evidence in Hernandez-Cuartas shows (1) that profile evidence cannot
be admitted "purely" as background evidence; and (2) that the profile
has no place in a jury trial due to its irrelevance and its substantial
prejudicial impact.
122
When the drug courier profile is admitted as background evidence,
the testimony goes far beyond merely placing the arrest in context.
It raises two inferences: (1) that the defendant matched the
profile-and, therefore, the police werejustified in stopping him; and
(2) that because the defendant matched the profile, he must have
known he was carrying drugs.
The first inference may be relevant to whether the officer's
suspicion of the defendant was sufficient to warrant an investigative
stop and, therefore, would be significant to a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the stop. But, as noted in Hernandez-Cuartas, it is not
relevant "to the charges against a defendant."12 ' The allegation
119. Id. at 555.
120. FED. R. EvID. 401 (emphasis added).
121. SeeFED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible."); see also Advisory Committee's Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1973) ("The
provisions that all relevant evidence is admissible, with certain exceptions, and that evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible are 'a presupposition involved in the very conception of
a rational system of evidence."' (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264-65 (1898)));JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6.01 (1996) ("The concept of relevancy is basic to the law of
evidence; it is the cornerstone on which any rational system of evidence rests. Without regard
to any other rules or considerations, an item of evidence cannot be admitted unless it meets the
test of relevancy."). Only a part of the author's treatment of profile issues related to
"inferences" and "relevancy" are presented here. For the Article s final analysis of these
subjects, see infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
122. It is questionable whether recitation of drug courier profile characteristics adds any
information to place the arrest into context. The profile is not part of the facts of the case; it
is an investigatory tool that was developed over time prior to the arrest. An officer quite easily
could place the arrest in context without the profile testimony simply by recounting his
observations of the defendant prior to the arrest.
123. Hernandez-Cuarlas, 717 F. 2dat555. In questioning the relevance of drug courier profile
testimony as background information, it is highly likely that when a defendant matches a profile
it might lead a jury to think that the defendant knew that he possessed drugs. See People v.
Derello, 259 Cal. Rptr. 265, 273 (Ct. App. 1989) (maintaining that profile evidence "has
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against most drug couriers is possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute." The elements of this offense are: (1) the defendant
possessed illegal narcotics; (2) the defendant knew he possessed those
narcotics; and (3) the defendant intended to distribute them."
The fact that police stop a defendant and find drugs is indeed "a fact
that is of consequence, and therefore is relevant evidence," but the
fact that the stop was premised upon the drug courier profile is
not.
1 26
A jury is not called upon to determine reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. 2  By the time of the trial, these issues already have
been decided adversely to the defendant. Thus, the first inference
created by profile testimony-that because the defendant matched the
absolutely no relevance to the elements of the crime and might be perceived by the jury to be
evidence of the character of defendants as drug couriers"). Once this inference is raised,
however, the evidence no longer is being offered as "background" evidence, but rather as
substantive evidence of guilt, which gives rise to the "substantive" inference that the majority of
courts have concluded is unduly prejudicial and inadmissible. See supra Part II.B.2 (questioning
relevance of profile testimony when prosecution seeks to admit it for background material at
trial).
It should be noted, however, that after United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), it is
questionable whether profile testimony is relevant even to justify police conduct when they
suspect and stop a defendant. See INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 56 ("The
majority of the court [in Sokolow] seemed to regard the fact that the agents were using a profile
as irrelevant; to the justices who voted to uphold the conviction, it was apparently the
circumstances themselves, not the existence ofa prepared profile, which constituted reasonable
suspicion.").
124. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1994) (prohibiting possession of controlled substance with
intent to distribute). Other charges frequently found in drug courier profile cases are for the
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which prohibits the attempt and conspiracy to commit a controlled
substance violation, and of the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 951-95,
which prohibits the import or export of controlled substances.
125. See id. § 841(a). This section provides:
Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally--
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense,
a counterfeit substance.
Id.; see also United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Intent and
knowledge are two of the three elements-the third is possession-of a 'possession with intent
to distribute' charge under 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1).").
126. FED. t EVID. 401 (defining what constitutes relevant evidence); see also supra note 120
and accompanying text (same).
127. SeeJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960) (emphasizing that motions to
suppress are "designed to eliminate from the trial disputes over police conduct not immediately
relevant to the question of guilt"); United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1283 (D.C. Cir.)
(concluding that presentation of profile testimony and references to profile in opening and
closing argument was error because it "was relevant only to the officers' probable cause and not
to Small's guilt"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1967 (1996); United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59-61
(4th Cir. 1988) (demonstrating that drug courier profile testimony usually is relevant to issues
relating to propriety of stop or arrest); Valcarcel v. State, 765 S.W.2d 412, 417-19 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (clarifying that profile evidence as it relates to officer's probable cause should not
be admitted unless defendant raises issue of probable cause for jury's consideration).
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profile, the police stop wasjustified-should be challenged as having
no place at trial. 28
The second inference is relevant only to prove the defendant's
guilt; the defendant matched the profile, therefore, he knew he
possessed drugs.'29 The majority rule, based on the determination
that profile evidence is unduly prejudicial, was created to prohibit this
inference."a° Consequently, background testimony about the drug
courier profile, having no relevance except to the prohibited guilt
inference, has no legitimate use at trial.' But the profile is reach-
ing the jury, often unchallenged, and, inherently, becomes strong
circumstantial evidence of guilt.
b. Background as foundation for expert opinion
The second background use of the profile is in qualifying a law
enforcement officer as an expert.3 2 Law enforcement officers often
explain the training they have received in drug courier profiling as a
foundation for their expert testimony.3 3  This use of the profile
presents the danger that ajury simply will accept the officer's expert
conclusions without weighing its probative value."M
When a law enforcement officer is qualified as an expert, the
officer gains a certain "aura of reliability."' Consequently, when
128. See Derello, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 272 (affirming that "[elvidence ofa nondisputed issue or
of an issue not before the jury is inadmissible"). The fact remains that the court does not have
the discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. See i.
Section 350 California Evidence Code provides that only relevant evidence is admissible, and
Section 210 Evidence Code provides that relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action." Derello, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
129. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (reviewing cases in which defendant's
characteristics were matched with drug courier profile).
130. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reviewing cases holding that use of drug
profile evidence was unduly prejudicial).
131. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing rule against using profile as
substantive evidence of guilt).
132. See FED. R. EvID. 102 (stating that witnesses may be qualified as experts due to their
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, No. 93-50310, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12406,
at *1, *4 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994) (stating that agent's trial testimony on her passenger profile
training that included evaluation of behavioral characteristics such as nervousness or shaking as
indications of drug smuggling provided background material for explanation for stop of
defendant).
134. SeegenerallyPhylisSkioutBamberger, TheDangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855
(1986) (stating that greater safeguards against potential prejudice are needed when law
enforcement officer testifies both as expert and as factual witness); Deon J. Nossel, Note, The
Admissibility Of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony By Law Enforcement Officers In Ciminal Trials, 93
COLUm. L REv. 231 (1993) (arguing that law enforcement officers' testimony as to guilt or
innocence or intent should be given little or no weight in assessment ofsufficiency of evidence).
135. See Nossel, supra note 134, at 246 (explaining that law officer's expert opinion may
appear more reliable to jury because of officer's experience in evaluating criminal behavior);
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an officer's expertise is based in part on drug courier profile training,
the profile becomes cloaked with the same aura.16 Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, the basis of the officer's expert opinion need
not itself be admissible so long as it is a basis reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field to form an opinion or inference. 37 Profile
evidence, however, is admitted at trial as an element of the officer's
expertise and as a basis for his opinion, although the drug courier
profile never has been proven reliable."a
Although the Supreme Court tacitly has accepted the profile as an
investigative tool in the Fourth Amendment realm,8 9 such recogni-
tion cannot be imputed to the trial arena, because "an officer's
see also United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring)
(declaring that risk is created when narcotics expert is allowed to testify as to her personal
opinion concerning defendant's role in drug operation because "aura of reliability and
trustworthiness" surrounding expert testimony may be overly persuasive to jury); People v.
Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Mich. Ct. 135App. 1995), appeal denied, 548 N.W.2d 634 (Mich.
1996) (finding that law enforcement testimony as expert witness may be prejudicial due to
disproportionate weight jury may give such evidence).
136. Cf Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829-30 (Fla. 1993) (examining risk of prejudice
of psychologist's testimony on sex offender profile). The court explained, "Profile testimony
... by its nature necessarily relies on some scientific principle or test, which implies an
infallibility not found in pure opinion testimony. The jury naturally will assume that the
scientific principles underlying the expert's conclusion are valid." Id. at 828.
137. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 governs the bases of opinion testimony by experts. It
establishes:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 703.
The second sentence of Rule 703 was written primarily in recognition that many experts rely
on data that may not be admissible because it does not pass the hearsay rule. SeeWFmNSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 121, § 13.03(01). The rule, consequently, enables experts to give opinions
based on hearsay so long as the hearsay is of the type that is "reasonably" relied upon in the
field. See id. § 13.03(02) (c). Drug courier profile testimony, as the foundation for an expert
opinion, presents certain hearsay concerns addressed by Rule 703. Law enforcement officers
testify about their training in the use of the drug courier profile by stating what they have been
instructed by other narcotics agents to look for in a suspected drug courier. Reliance on this
basis for an expert opinion is not appropriate at trial. The challenge to profile evidence
discussed in this section is in the context of Rule 703. This discussion, however, is but a part
of the more important analysis the profile receives in this Article.
138. See, eg., Becton, supra note 1, at 470 (asserting that drug courier profiles should be used
to investigate but should not be used to justify stop); Cloud, supra note 1, at 884-920 (providing
thorough analysis demonstrating profile's unreliability as investigative tool); see also Hubbard, 530
N.W.2d at 134 n.2 (declaring that prosecution did not provide evidence on reliability of drug
profile and that "junk science" was not acceptable to court); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538,
547 (Minn. 1994) (noting that police may use profiles as factor in stopping suspected drug
couriers but that such profiles are not scientific and should not be relied upon mechanically by
officers and stating that courts should not defer mechanically to police testimony on profile
evidence).
139. See supra notes 17-64 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court's treatment of
drug courier profile).
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expertise lies in determining when a search or arrest is justified, not
in determining when a defendant should be convicted."
40 No
statistical records or empirical studies exist that prove validity of the
profile.'41 In fact, there is no nationally recognized profile upon
which all law enforcement agents rely.4  Thus, without a judicial
determination that the drug courier profile is in fact a technique that
"reasonably" can be relied upon by law enforcement agents, it is not
an appropriate basis for an expert opinion on the issue of guilt.
4 1
Therefore, expert background information also should not be
admitted in a jury trial.
3. Modus operandi evidence
Profile data, in the form of modus operandi'" testimony, can be
offered in two ways: (1) as general information about the typical
behavior of drug traffickers; or (2) as specific details about the
defendant's conduct with an explanation of why this conduct should
be construed as drug-related activity. Both methods inherently
compare the profile with the defendant's conduct, thus constituting
substantive evidence of guilt.
a. Generalized use
Profile evidence for the limited purpose of showing modus
operandi is testimony by an officer explaining the techniques
140. Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d at 184.
141. To date, the DEA does not maintain statistical data on the accuracy of the drug courier
profile. Telephone Interview with Paul Markonni, DEA Agent, Savannah, Ga. (Aug. 6, 1996).
142. See Becton, supra note 1, at 433-34 (stating that not only is there no national profile but
that individual agents, law enforcement agencies, and courts each have their own profile
characteristics, including variations for different types of suspects); see also United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (characterizing drug courier profile as
"chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations" (citing United States v.
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987))).
143. SeeNossel, supra note 134, at 247 (arguing that it may be prejudicial ifjury accepts law
enforcement officer's testimony based on hunch or if evidence does not indicate guilt beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant's behavior was criminal).
144. Two different types of modus operandi evidence arise in drug courier profile cases. The
first type arises when generalized profile characteristics are given to explain the typical behavior
and techniques used by drug traffickers. The second type arises when an expert law
enforcement officer recounts the specific conduct of the defendant, and then gives an opinion
that the conduct is the modus operandi of drug traffickers. Although, in theory, there may be
a distinction between the two, in practice, they have become indistinguishable. Although this
Article focuses on the dangers of generalized profile evidence, both types of modus operandi
evidence will be addressed separately because, in practice, both types allow profile evidence to
reach thejury and raise the inference that the defendant knew he possessed drugs and intended
to distribute them. See infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text (discussing modus operandi
evidence usage generally and specifically).
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employed by people who operate within the drug trade."14 Law
enforcement agents routinely are allowed to testify about the typical
behavior exhibited by drug couriers."4 Many courts have admitted
generalized drug courier profile evidence under this exception. 47
The justification for admission typically is that the average juror does
not understand the activities and practices of drug dealers.'4
Because of this lack of understanding, jurors are unable to draw
inferences necessary to decide the case without modus operandi
information about the drug business.
49
Thus, courts originally allowed the modus operandi exception to
enable the government to present limited testimony in complex and
confusing cases, particularly in those involving drug conspiracies.
50
What originated as a very narrow exception, however, has been
broadened and now is used commonly to justify admission of profile
testimony even in uncomplicated, simple possession cases.5
Admitting generalized profile testimony to explain modus operandi
presents the same inferences as when it is used as "background.""2
145. See United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that qualified
law enforcement officers may testify about methods and techniques associated with criminal
activity).
146. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 1989) (referring to well-
established principle that federal court has discretion to allow law enforcement officers to testify
as experts as to modus operandi of criminals in instances in which jury may not be familiar with
such activities). But see United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that admissibility of drug profile evidence to establish modus operandi is questionable because
purpose of such testimony, to advise jury about possible link between seemingly unconnected
and innocent events and criminal behavior, is exactly why such testimony is dangerous).
147. See Christopher Bello, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Modus Operandi
oflCrime-Modern Cases, 31 A.L.RATH 798 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (analyzing federal and state
opinions since 1960 that address issue of admissibility of expert testimony on modus operandi
of particular crime, including drug profile cases).
148. See United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417,428-29 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowing use of law
enforcement officer's expert testimony on grounds that jury is not in position to understand
modus operandi of drug operations).
149. See id.
150. See, gg., United States v. Carrillo-De Molina, No. 92-10025, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14856,
at *10 (9th Gir. June 6, 1994) (restating that drug courier profile evidence to establish modus
operandi is admissible only in complex cases); Lui, 941 F.2d at 848 (conceding appropriateness
of modus operandi exception in some instances, such as complex drugsmuggling conspiracies);
United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that admission of
modus operandi evidence is allowed to help jury understand complex criminal activity).
Although extensive background evidence may be necessary in conspiracy cases for the jury
to understand the myriad of roles involved in such a case, it is questionable whether generalized
"drug courier profile" evidence would be helpful even in these complex cases. The drug courier
profile gives no information to explain the role of the courier in a conspiracy case, but merely
describes characteristics purportedly displayed while playing that role, many of which are
characteristics shared with innocent people.
151. See Lu4 941 F.2d at 848 (holding that admission of drug courier profile evidence to
prove possession was erroneous).
152. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing drug courier profile use in
investigating stops and its use as background information at trial).
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Testimony about general profile characteristics inherently raises the
inference that the defendant matches the modus operandi of a drug
courier; therefore, she must have known that she possessed drugs.5 3
This inference is precisely what the majority rule supposedly for-
bids-comparison between the typical drug courier and the defendant
in order to prove guilt."5 Given the majority view's interpretation
of "substantive evidence," profile testimony routinely is admitted so
long as no direct comparison is made to the defendant's conduct. 5
Thus, courts pay lip-service to the majority rule, and then by legal
fiction in the form of modus operandi testimony, admit profile
evidence.1
56
b. Specialized use: expert opinions on modus operandi
A second use of modus operandi evidence is even more disconcert-
ing. Law enforcement agents use modus operandi evidence as an
integral part of their expert opinions."5  This category can be
distinguished from generalized modus operandi evidence because
only specific characteristics of the defendant are discussed. 5 "
Expert law enforcement officers routinely are allowed to give direct
opinions regarding the significance of the defendant's specific
conduct. 59 Opinions explaining the significance of specific conduct
fitting modus operandi of drug traffickers inherently make direct
comparisons between the defendant and elements of the profile.
16
153. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing cases that used drug courier profile
evidence as background to explain modus operandi).
154. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that found use of drug profile
evidence was unduly prejudicial).
155. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that used drug courier profile
evidence as substantive evidence of guilt).
156. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which drug courier
profile evidence was admitted as modus operandi evidence).
157. See United States v. Ramirez-Gomez, No. 93-50310, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12406, at *4-5
(9th Cir. May 25, 1994) (distinguishing between profile evidence used as background evidence
and profile evidence used as substantive evidence of guilt).
The difference between expert opinions on modus operandi and generalized modus operandi
testimony is simple: There is no inferential step required when an expert explains the
significance of the defendant's conduct; direct comparisons are made between the profile and
the defendant. The expert typically recounts the conduct of the defendant, then explains that
in his experience most drug dealers exhibit that conduct, and therefore, in his opinion, the
defendant was exhibiting the modus operandi of a drug trafficker.
158. See id.
159. See generally Bamberger, supra note 134, at 856-57 (analyzing use of law enforcement
officers' testimony as both expert and factual witness); Nossel, supra note 134, at 250-55
(discussing admissibility of expert testimony of law enforcement agents); Bello, supra note 147,
at 802-04 (reviewing use of modus operandi testimony by law enforcement officials in state and
federal cases).
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (explaining that modus operandi evidence
is used to compare defendant's conduct with officer's previous experience with other drug
774
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These opinions are tantamount to substantive evidence of guilt, but
rarely are questioned by the courts."'
The trial court has wide discretion in choosing to accept expert
testimony that is outside the common knowledge of jurors and that
will assist the trier of fact.'62 Thus, the threshold question is wheth-
er the testimony will help the jury."~ The majority of courts have
concluded that expert testimony on the "drug courier profile" does
not meet this threshold analysis when offered as substantive evidence
of guilt,"6 because it sweeps so broadly as to include innocent as
well as suspicious acts."6 In determining whether to admit expert
opinions, however, courts purport to distinguish between "innocent"
characteristics and characteristics that implicate criminal activity."6
Expert opinions, therefore, readily are admitted to explain the
significance of profile characteristics that implicate criminal modus
operandi 67 Significantly, experts are permitted to testify about the
use of beepers,' 68 counter-surveillance techniques,169 and weapons
dealers).
161. See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 1990) (testimony that
quantity of drugs indicates intent to distribute); United States v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354,360 (7th
Cir. 1989) (testimony that defendant's behavior constitutes counter-surveillance); United States
v. Brown, 776 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1986) (testimony that defendant's behavior indicates being
member of drug trade); see also Nossel, supra note 134, at 261-63 (noting that many courts fail
to subject ultimate issue expert testimony to standard of applicable rules of evidence).
162. See FED. R. EvID. 702 (allowing expert testimony to assist jury in understanding
evidence); FED. R. EvID. 703 (stating that expert may testify as to facts or data upon which he
relied); FED. R. EVID. 704 (disallowing ultimate issue opinion by expert); FED. R. EviD. 705
(allowing expert testimony not accompanied by facts underlying opinion).
163. See State v. Odom, 560 A.2d 1198, 1201 (N.J. 1989) (providing that admissibility of
expert testimony is based not on whether subject matter is common knowledge but on whether
expert wimess has particular knowledge or experience that is not common and that aids
faetfinder).
164. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (examining majority courts' interpretation of
drug courier profile testimony as substantive evidence of guilt).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983)
(condemning use of drug courier profiles as substantive evidence of guilt).
166. See People v. Derello, 259 Cal. Rptr. 265, 270 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that only drug
profile characteristics that indicate ongoing criminal activity are admissible).
167. See, eg., United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that ban against profile evidence does not preclude officer from testifying to significance of
defendant's incriminating behavior or from linking this behavior to drug trade).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207,212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that
trial judge did not abuse discretion by allowing proof of defendant's possession of beeper and
expert testimony that drug dealers use beepers). Oddly, courts continue to treat possession of
a beeper as indicative of criminal activity even though they have become commonplace in our
society. See id. (citing United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282,1286 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25,
28 (2d Cir. 1987)).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 723 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing testimony
on drug dealers' method of registering property in another person's name to conceal criminal
activity becausejury may not be familiar with such methods).
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in the drug trade, 7° because, unlike most profile characteristics,
these activities are not deemed to be innocuous.
1 7'
Challenges to these expert opinions generally have been framed as
violations of Federal Rule of Evidence 704, as improper "ultimate
opinions" on either state of mind or guilt. 72 The argument is that
officers implicitly testify on state of mind or guilt when they give an
opinion that the defendant's conduct conformed to modus operandi
of drug activity: he acted like a drug courier, therefore, he is a drug
courier.
In criminal cases, under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), an expert
is forbidden explicitly from stating an opinion or an inference on
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged.1 73  Most
courts have been reluctant to find a violation of 704(b) in profile
cases. 74 In fact, many have questioned whether 704(b) applies to
expert law enforcement officers' opinions. 75 The legislative history
of 704(b) supports some skepticism as to its application and suggests
that Congress intended to limit the scope of expert testimony by
psychiatric and mental health experts. 176  The Advisory Committee
170. See United States v. Escamilla, No. 93-50094, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28732, at *3 (9th
Cir. Oct. 27, 1993) (determining that expert opinion testimony that connected weapon to drug
deal was admissible as modus operandi evidence and that this evidence was different from drug
courier profile evidence because carrying weapon is not innocuous conduct).
171. See iti But see United States v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging fact that behavior is common does not prohibit automatically admission of
expert testimony that attributes behavior to criminal actions and cautioning courts to ensure
that such testimony is not prejudicial and does not take over function ofjury).
172. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or a defense thereto.
FED. R. EvwD. 704.
173. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1239-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
case law and determining that Rule 704(b) does not limit law enforcement officers' testimony
that includes opinion on criminal nature of defendant's activities); United States v. Richard, 969
F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing law enforcement officer's expert opinion that
implies that defendant was engaging in criminal activity from opinion that directly draws
conclusion for jury).
175. See Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239-42.
176. The legislative history provides:
With respect to limitations on the scope of expert testimony by psychiatrists and other
mental health experts, section 406 of title IV of the bill amends Rule 704 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to [add section (b)].... The purpose of this amendment
is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to
directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier
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notes, however, provide language to indicate that the rule applies to
all experts.177 Thus, no federal court has refused to apply the rule
to police experts, they simply have refused to find violations of the
rule.'
78
An expert law enforcement officer may testify that the defendant's
conduct conformed to criminal activity so long as the officer refrains
from saying that the defendant "intended" to commit the crime
charged.179 Consequently, in drug cases, expert law enforcement
officers can "describe in general terms the common practices of those
who clearly do possess the requisite intent, leaving unstated the
inference that the defendant, having been caught engaging in more
or less the same practices, also possessed the requisite intent"180
without running afoul of 704(b).
181
of fact. Under this proposal, expert psychiatric testimony would be limited to
presenting and explaining their diagnosis, such as whether the defendant had a severe
mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such disease or defect, if any,
may have been.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3412.
177. The SenateJudiciary Committee notes state:
Moreover, the rationale for precluding ultimate opinion psychiatric testimony extends
beyond the insanity defense to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that is
relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven. The Committee has fashioned
its Rule 704 provision to reach all such "ultimate" issues, e.g., premeditation in a
homicide case, or lack of predisposition in entrapment.
Id at 231, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3413.
178. See, e.g., Richar, 969 F.2d at 855 n.6 ("The legislative history suggests that Congress only
intended to limit 'the scope of expert testimony by psychiatrists and other mental health
experts.' However, no federal circuit court has so held.") (citation omitted). Much of the
controversy over the application of 704(b) may stem from the language "mental state." This
legal term of art often is used interchangeably for mens rea or state of mind. "State of mind"
is defined as "a person's reasons and motives for acting as he did... used in connection with
evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (6th ed. 1990).
"Mens rea" is defined as "an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or
wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." Id. at 985. "Mental state" is defined as "capacity or
condition of one's mind in terms of ability to do or not to do a certain act." Id. at 986.
179. SeeUnited States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964,970 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In interpreting [704(b)],
courts have distinguished between expert opinion testimony that describes the significance of
a defendant's actions to an illegal enterprise from opinion testimony that a defendant had an
actual thought or intent."); Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239 (stating that validity of expert testimony
of law enforcement officers under Rule 704(b) depends on whether expert speculates as to
actual intent of defendant or merely describes common practices of drug couriers, allowingjury
to infer whether defendant had requisite intent from how completely defendant meets profile);
United States v. Rendon, No. 93-6033, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32619, at *6-7 (10th Cir. Dec. 8,
1993) ("'Rule 704(b) only prevents experts from expressly stating the final conclusion or
inference as to a defendant's actual mental state. The rule does not prevent the expert from
testifying to facts or opinions from which the jury could conclude or infer the defendant had
the requisite mental state.'") (citation omitted). Analysis in these cases seems to ignore
completely the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) states that an expert may not make a
statement or inference about the defendant's state of mind.
180. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239.
181. See id.; see also Richard, 969 F.2d at 855 (finding that police officer's opinion testimony
concerning roles performed by defendant was not prohibited ultimate issue testimony); cf
United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1995) (admitting -testimony that "drug
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"Ultimate issue" challenges"8 2 are indistinguishable from 704(b)
challenges. The concern, again, is that an expert law enforcement
officer gives an opinion about the significance of physical evidence or
the defendant's particular behavior, and then proceeds to draw a
conclusion that infers guilt.'" Although expert opinions on ulti-
mate issues no longer are forbidden,"as most courts still refuse to
allow expert opinions on the ultimate question of guilt.1"a Such an
opinion is not helpful to the trier of fact; it merely tells the jury what
to do.'86 In fact, the Second Circuit gives little weight to expert
ultimate issue opinions in a "sufficiency of the evidence review."
7
Inexplicably, without reasoned analysis or findings on the validity of
the profile, courts admit opinions going to the ultimate issue.' S It
traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names,
make narcotics and cash deliveries in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public
telephones").
182. See supra note 172 (stating ultimate issue rule).
.183. See United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We have repeatedly
expressed our discomfort with expert testimony in narcotics cases that not only describes the
significance of certain conduct or physical evidence in general, but also draws conclusions as to
the significance of that conduct or evidence in the particular case.").
184. See supra note 172 (distinguishing testimony in form of opinion not objectionable
though it addresses ultimate issue from expert witness testimony stating opinion whether
defendant had requisite state of mind to satisfy mens rea element of crime). See generally Anne
Lawson Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and
the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 620 (1987) (analyzing effect of 704(b) on ultimate issue
rule).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Huerta-Macias, No. 93-50230, 1994 U.S. App. LEXS 12397, at
*1 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994) ("Drug courier profile testimony is not admissible as substantive
evidence of guilt, and an expert cannot opine about a defendant's guilt.") (citations omitted);
United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The use of expert testimony as
substantive evidence showing that the defendant 'fits the profile and, therefore, must have
intended to distribute the cocaine in his possession' is error." (quoting United States v. Quigley,
820 F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir 1989))); United v. Carter, 901 F.2d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 1991)
("Drug courier profiles are investigative tools, not evidence of guilt."). See generally 11JAMES WM.
MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE § 702 (2d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1996) (evaluating state
of law on issue of admissibility of expert opinions on ultimate issue of guilt).
186. See Kathy Jo Cook, An Opinion: Federal Judges Misconstrue Rule 704. (Or Is That an
Impermissible Legal Conclusion?), 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 45, 57 (1995) (contending that courts
repeatedly admit expert testimony regarding "intent to distribute" in narcotics possession cases
even though such testimony proffers conclusion on critical issue in case thatjury ultimately must
decide); see also United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing
conviction when expert made inference that jury itself was capable of making).
187. See Boisenneault 926 F.2d at 230 (declaring that expert testimony on "ultimate issues"
in criminal cases should be given minimal probative value, especially in circumstances where
government produces no evidence from which "requisite criminal intent" must be inferred); see
alsoJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (setting forth standard for appellate review on
issue of whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to convince jury of defendant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt).
188. See, e.g. United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing
opinion testimony on defendant's role in drug scheme); United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397,
400 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing opinion that defendant was a "steerer"). See generally Boisenneault,
926 F.2d at 232 (discussing numerous cases that have admitted police expert's conclusory
opinions on defendant's role in drug enterprise).
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is apparent in examining these exceptions to the majority rule that
the distinction between admission under an exception and admissibili-
ty as substantive evidence of guilt most often is one without a differ-
ence.189 It also is apparent that the profile, having never been
adjudged to possess empirical validity, adds little probative value to a
case."9 Perhaps it is the majority's unreasoned admission of profile
evidence under the guise of "exceptions" that prompted the Seventh
Circuit to reject the majority "rule" and to admit directly the profile
as evidence of guilt.
C. The Seventh Circuit: Bucking or Leading the Trend?
In three separate opinions, each addressing different aspects of
profile use, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "drug courier profile"
evidence is admissible to prove the guilt of an accused. 91 The first
case to establish the minority position was United States v. Teslim.19'
Although the court addressed the issue as a drug courier profile
problem,'93 the classification is misleading. Teslim claimed that the
prosecutor elicited drug courier profile evidence that had no
relevance to any issue at trial."M The Seventh Circuit concluded
that "the drug courier profile testimony was relevant to the issue of
proving the defendant's guilt or innocence." ' 5 The court explained
that this testimony was relevant to prove the elements of possession
and the chain of custody,'96 noting that the arresting officer's
"observations" of Teslim exiting the plane with luggage-later found
to contain cocaine-were the only means to prove these two ele-
ments.1
97
In Teslim, the court did not suggest that a generalized list of profile
characteristics be admitted. 98  Rather, the court repeatedly indicat-
ed that the evidence pertained to the actual observed behavior of the
189. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (admitting eye witness testimony to prove
chain of custody under label of drug courier profile), note 201 and accompanying text
(admitting expert officer testimony regarding use of beepers by drug traffickers), and notes 214-
17 and accompanying text (admitting general profile characteristics to prove knowledge).
190. See Boissoneault 926 F.2d at 234.
191. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d
548 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1989).
192. 869 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1989).
193. See Teslim, 869 F.2d at 324.
194. See i&.
195. Id.
196. See id. The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. See Tes/im, 869 F.2d at 324.
197. See id.
198. See id. (indicating that such evidence was presented at hearing on motion to suppress).
The Court consistently discussed "the observations of the police officers" when discussing trial
testimony classified as "profile" evidence. See i&
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defendant.' Testimony that focuses entirely upon the actions of
the defendant, recounting the facts leading to the ultimate stop and
apprehension, does not raise a profile issue; rather, it is basic
eyewitness, fact evidence. Although, the court in Teslim
mischaracterized fact evidence as a profile, its literal language often
is cited as permitting profile evidence as proof of guilt.
2°°
In United States v. Solis,2°1 the Seventh Circuit examined whether
expert officer testimony regarding the use of beepers by drug
traffickers was appropriate and helpful to the jury.202 This case was
typical of those involving expert opinions on modus operandi of drug
traffickers. 2" At trial, the government attempted to elicit expert
testimony from a narcotics agent about the use of beepers in drug
trafficking in order to prove circumstantially Solis' intent to distribute
cocaine. 2°' The defendant objected to this testimony as being
irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 25  The trial court, overruling the
objection, concluded that expert testimony explaining the common
use of beepers by drug traffickers would assist the jury.
2 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2 7 The primary issue at
trial was the defendant's intent to distribute cocaine.2" The court
held that because the government's proof of intent was shown by
circumstantial evidence, the defendant's possession of numerous
beeper numbers was relevant.2°9 The expert testimony assisted the
jury by explaining the significance of beepers in the drug trade,
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445,451 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v, Solis,
923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991).
201. 923 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1991)
202. See Solis, 923 F.2d at 551.
203. See id at 549 (evoking prevalence of beeper use in drug trade). Acting on a tip, police
stopped Solis at O'Hare Airport. They asked to see her identification and her ticket. They
learned that her ticket had been paid for with cash. Solis consented to a search, and police
found cocaine and a notebook containing several beeper numbers. See i& at 549-50; see also
United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1238 (7th Cir. 1994) (testimony regarding significance
of packaging of drugs); Foster, 939 F.2d at 454 (testimony on methods used by drug traffickers);
United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1991) (testimony regarding significance
of amount of drugs, packaging, and money found on defendant); United States v. Campino, 890
F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1989) (testimony regarding notebooks and electronic equipment found
and practices of drug traffickers); United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1986)
(testimony on modus operandi of Pakistani drug trade).
204. See Solis, 923 F.2d at 549.
205. See id.
206. See id. ("'[F]ora 68 year old person who is at poverty level of most definitions of income
in the United States to have a large number of friends that own beepers might be a question
that the jury could reasonably consider.'").
207. See id.
208. See id. at 551.
209. See it. ("Evidence of Ms. Solis' actions and of the other articles in her possession was
therefore relevant on the issue of whether she intended to distribute the contraband.").
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thereby allowing the jury to find that the defendant, who possessed
numerous beeper numbers, knowingly was part of that drug trade. 1
Here, as in most modus operandi cases, officers explained the
significance of the defendant's conduct by comparing it to the profile
conduct of drug couriers."' Although arguably in direct conflict
with the majority rule, Solis follows the pattern of case law admitting
expert opinions on modus operandi 212 The Seventh Circuit accu-
rately determined that expert opinions about profile factors constitute
substantive proof of guilt, and went one step further to conclude that
such use of the profile is admissible."1
In the third Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Foster,"4 the
court bypassed all the exceptions, contradictions, and fictitious
distinctions in the case law, and admitted generalized evidence of the
drug courier profile to prove knowledge of drug possession.2 15 The
only issue at trial was whether the defendant "knew" he was transport-
ing cocaine.216 Evidence was admitted to permit the inference that
Foster matched general profile characteristics, and, therefore, must
have had the requisite knowledge.17 The court concluded that the
drug profile evidence was relevant and therefore was admissible as
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's knowledge.1 The court
declared that "activity that 'may appear, to the outside observer, to be
perfectly normal and innocent' may take on an entirely new signifi-
cance when placed in context by expert testimony."219  Thus, the
court unequivocally allowed a direct comparison between the
defendant and the drug courier profile as substantive evidence of
guilt.
220
Given this trend in the law to admit profile evidence, it would be
beneficial for all courts to re-examine the underlying purpose for the
210. See id. at 550-51.
211. See id. at 549. The prosecution submitted a memorandum concerning the admissibility
of expert testimony on the practices of drug traffickers, including the use of beepers. The agent
testified about the use of beepers in the drug trade, noting that it made drug traffickers more
mobile and anonymous.
212. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
213. See Sois, 923 F.2d at 550-51.
214. 939 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1991).
215. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1991).
216. See i. at 449. Foster exited an Amtrak train pulling two very new looking hard-sided
suitcases. He appeared nervous and looked repeatedly over his shoulder as if someone were
following him. Police stopped him for questioning. One case fell over and emitted a puff of
white powder assumed to be talcum powder. See id. at 448.
217. SeeiL at 449-51 (admittingpolice officer's testimony of 10 general characteristics typical
of drug couriers, including source city information). Foster matched most of the profile factors.
218. See id. at 452.
219. Id. (quoting United States v. De Soto, 885 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1989)).
220. See id.
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much diluted majority rule. Such an analysis will explain why profile
evidence never should be admitted at trial, except as rebuttal
evidence.
III. A STRONG PROFILE: IT IS A MARK ON CHARACTER AND A
BLIGHT ON JUSTICE
Courts espousing the majority rule prohibiting profile evidence as
substantive evidence of guilt221 have stated that "[t]he broad brush
painted by ... [drug courier] profiles inevitably will cover many
innocent individuals"222 and that "[e]very defendant has a right to
be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on the
techniques utilized by the law enforcement officers in investigating
criminal activity."2 " Embodied in these decisions is the determina-
tion that profile evidence simply is too prejudicial to be admitted to
prove guilt.224 Federal courts and most state courts, however, have
failed to confront the profile in an intellectually honest and proper
context: Profile testimony is "akin" to the introduction of bad
character evidence"S and presents issues that jeopardize the funda-
mental fairness of the trial itself.226 Several state courts, in various
types of profile cases, have begun to recognize the character implica-
tions of profile evidence, and to prohibit admission of it on that
basis.227
221. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717
F.2d 552,555 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995),
app. denied, 548 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 1996) (acknowledging wide condemnation of drug courier
profiles as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt). Although this rule is recited continually
by the majority of circuits, it has been so subsumed by exceptions that the rule has little if any
remaining vitality.
222. Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d at 134 (acknowledging that trial court abused its discretion by
admitting drug courier profile evidence used by prosecutor to establish defendant's substantive
guilt, but ultimately deeming admission to be harmless error).
223. I&
224. See id.
225. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRAGMICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5233 (1978 & Supp. 1996) (equating quality and effect of drug courier profile
evidence with introduction of bad character evidence).
226. See Hubbard, 530 N.W.2d at 134.
227. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Ct. App. 1992) (car theft profile);
Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (child sex abuse offender profile);
Commonwealth v. Day, 569 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1991) (child batterer profile); State v. Williams,
525 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1994) (drug courier profile); State v. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990) (sexual abuser profile); State v. Haynes, No. 4310, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3811,
at *1 (Sept. 21, 1988) (anger-retaliatory murder profile); Wilson v. State, 871 P.2d 46 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1994) (drug dealer profile).
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One particularly apt general assessment of profiles is that they
constitute "group character evidence."
28
A moment's reflection on these categories of evidence reveals that
"group" character evidence is objectionable for the same reason as
is traditional character evidence: probative value depends upon the
jury drawing the forbidden inference that the defendant has a
propensity to commit the crime with which he is charged.2 9
Such an inference is forbidden under all state and federal character
evidence rules.2 °
Focusing on the "group character" theory, in the context of the
child abuser profile, the Florida Court of Appeals explained the
danger involved: "Evidence of the propensity of a particular group to
commit a crime shifts the focus of the jury to the question of whether
the accused is a member of the particular group."" Introduction
of the "group" character traits "indirectly brings the [defendant's]
character into issue."
232
The jury may conclude that the defendant must be guilty because
he appears to be a member of the group. Such a determination is
based on the premise that the characteristics of the group are
indicative of guilt. This is a premise that never has been validat-
ed. 233
228. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d at32 (emphasis added) ("'Group' character evidence.., attempts
to prove that because other persons have acted in certain ways in the past, a defendant who shares
common characteristics with those persons is likely to have acted the same way with respect to
the crime charged.").
229. Id.; see also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, § 7.01(01) (stating that traditional
exclusion of circumstantial character evidence on grounds of "lack of probative value" and
"likelihood of prejudice or confusion" isjustified by theory thatjury will misuse evidence). "The
rule rests on the theory that the risk that the jury will convict for crimes other than those
charged, or because defendant deserves punishment for his prior bad acts, outveighs the
probative value of the inference, 'he's done it before, he's done or will do it again.'" Id.
230. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor,
(3) Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, § 404(21) (noting that
majority of states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404 either verbatim or in some
modified form).
231. Flanagan. 586 So. 2d at 1123 (WolJ., concurring).
232. Id. at 1124 (WolfJ., concurring) (noting that group character profiles have "even less
probative value than direct evidence of defendant's character").
233. See generally Becton, supra note 1; Cloud, supra note 1.
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The danger is exacerbated when group character evidence is
presented by an expert, because the jury may defer to the expert who
is experienced in the field of profiles by concluding that if the expert
found a profile match, the defendant is a member of the group, and
therefore, is guilty.2"
Classification of profile evidence as character evidence, however,
raises yet another question: whether the profile is permissible
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts235 that legitimately may be
admitted to prove intent and knowledge.3 6  The defendant's
conduct that originally aroused suspicion of law enforcement officers
may be offered to provide circumstantial evidence of knowledge or
intent,"7 but the fact that he matched a profile should not be
offered.21 Such evidence does not reflect the defendant's motiva-
tion for behaving in a certain manner, but rather imposes on the
defendant the motivation of third parties not connected to the
charged crime.
2 9
234. See Flanagan, 586 So. 2d at 1124 ("'[I]t invites the jury to conclude that because an
expert experienced in child abuse cases identifies an accused as someone fitting a particular
profile, it is more likely than not that this individual committed the crime."') (citation omitted).
See generaly State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1994) (convicting defendant because of
defendant's resemblance to group profile); Bamberger, supra note 134 (examining dangers of
expert testimony based on profiles).
235. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
236. See id, One commentator has pointed out the character implications of expert opinions
on modus operandi:
An even less defensible ploy for evading the restrictions on character evidence is the
use of'expert testimony' about the practices of some criminal sub-culture. The expert
testifies that cocaine dealers behave in a certain way, evidence is offered that the
defendant behaved in the same way, then in argument the jury is told that since the
defendant behaved like a cocaine dealer, he must be a cocaine dealer and hence must
be guilty of the charged cocaine deal. This can escape Rule 404 only on the
supposition that being a drug dealer is not an attribute of 'character'.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 225, § 5233.
237. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (stating that drug courier profile in
conjunction with police impressions may be relevant to proving defendant's guilt or intent).
238. See Wilson v. State, 871 P.2d 46, 48-49 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) ("The particular facts
which are used to define a 'profile' may be admissible for other purposes such as proof of
motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, identity or common scheme or plan ....
However, while such facts may be admissible, evidence concerning the 'profile' itself should be
excluded.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
239. See Wdiams, 525 N.W.2d at 547-48 ("Normally proof of character involves witnesses who
generalize on the basis of past acts of the defendant and this generalization is used to support
an inference as to the conduct in issue. The drug courier profile involves a generalization based
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The group character analysis is a new concept. It presents a more
reasoned and more intellectually honest approach to profiling. More
importantly, because it is based on a very specific evidentiary concept,
the courts must analyze the prejudicial impact of the testimony in the
context of well established character evidence rules. The majority
rule, on the other hand, is based on the more general concept that
a "profile match" is too prejudicial to be admitted.2" But this rule
has opened the door to several major exceptions,24 and, all too
often, any error created by departure from the rule is deemed to be
harmless.242
Testimony about "profile matches," direct or indirect, is far from
harmless. Such evidence presents the defendant with an impossible
dilemma: "' [E]vidence of crimes committed by a third person who is
not on trial saddles a defendant with the burden of proving the
innocence of another."'2  This burden violates a defendant's
fundamental due process right,2 thus requiring review for constitu-
tional harmless error.2"
In People v. Martinez,2" the California Court of Appeals addressed
the futility of fighting profile evidence.247  The defendant,
Martinez, was stopped en route to Central America,2" driving
a Toyota truck he claimed was purchased several days prior
to the stop.249 The vehicle actually had been stolen two days
earlier."' At trial, law enforcement agents presented testimony
regarding the "typical auto theft ring."251 The court found this
on the past acts of third persons."(citing 22 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE § 5233 n.53.2 (Supp. 1994))).
240. See People v. Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 840 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting federal circuit
court's belief that drug courier profiles are prejudicial); Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 548 (rejecting
profile evidence because it urged jury to infer guilt).
241. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing court-created exceptions).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Carillo-De Molina, No. 92-10025 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14856,
at *11 (9th Cir.June 6, 1994); United States v. 1r, 984 F.2d 331, 335 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1989).
243. Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841 (quoting People v.Jackson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 208, 211 (Ct.
App. 1967)).
244. See i& (stating that forcing defendant to prove another's innocence "'violates the
fundamental principles of due process of the law'" (quotingJackson, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 211)).
245. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (reiterating doctrine that
constitutional error is harmless only if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
246. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Ct. App. 1992).
247. See id. at 841-42 (commenting on strong presumption of guilt that profile evidence
creates injuries).
248. See i. at 839.
249. See id.
250. See id
251. K. at 83940.
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"profile" 2 analogous to "similar transactions" evidence used to
prove intent, comparing it to People v.Jackson, a burglary case in which
evidence of similar crimes was offered at trial.
253
In Jackson, the prosecution offered evidence of four similar crimes
in which the defendant was not involved.2" Holding that admission
of the evidence was error, the court in Jackson stated that evidence of
crimes implicating no one never can be allowed into court.255 The
court explained:
[A] defendant charged with robbing a service station [should not]
be convicted by proof that four other service stations were robbed
in the same city on the same night by persons unknown, simply
because the modus operandi as to each of the other crimes was the
same as that employed to commit the crime charged."s
Using the rationale of the court in Jackson, the court in Martinez
criticized the use of profiles in order to prove that the defendant was
lying about not knowing that he had purchased a stolen car.
25 7
Specifically, the prosecutor tried to prove that the defendant was lying
simply because other drivers driving similar vehicles under similar
circumstances also claimed ignorance. The court criticized the
prosecution's attempt to have the jury consider the defendant's claim
of ignorance25 in order to substantiate the theory that the other
drivers also were lying when they denied knowledge.2 59 From this,
the prosecutor wanted the jury to conclude that the defendant knew
the vehicle was stolen.2" The court wrote: "This sort of bootstrap
reasoning is impermissible and the trial court erred in admitting the
252. See . at 840 (noting that purpose of auto theft ring evidence was to show that
defendant matched profile of typical participant). The court pointed to several factors used in
creating the "profile":
(1) The similarity between defendant's car and other stolen automobiles taken to
Central America; (2) the road taken by defendant was commonly used in transporting
stolen vehicles to Central America; (3) defendant was traveling during a time that was
popular with those transporting stolen automobiles; (4) the false documents possessed
by defendant were normally found on individuals moving stolen cars; and (5)
defendant's claim of ignorance and that he bought the truck on a street comer was a
popular story among car smugglers.
L at 840-41.
253. See id. at 841 (discussing People v.Jackson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1967)).
254. See i. (noting that although defendant's alleged accomplice was connected to first three
crimes, neither defendant nor his alleged accomplice was tied to fourth crime).
255. See id.
256. IK
257. See id. at 840-41.
258. See id. at 841.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 841-42.
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evidence of other crimes without first requiring proof that defendant
was connected with the other crimes."261
In short, the court found no link between the profile and the
defendant's veracity. More importantly, the court recognized that the
error could not be considered harmless, finding at trial that intent
was a close question and that the officer's testimony constituted a
large part of the prosecution's case.262 It takes little imagination to
see how this analysis applies to drug courier cases.
In State v. Williams," the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
the same type of "bootstrapping" occurred when the drug courier
profile was used: "'The jury is asked to infer from the fact that the
defendant shares some of the characteristics of these third persons
that he shares their guilt of drug smuggling. ' '2 Using reasoning
similar to that developed in Martinez, the court determined that
admission of this profile evidence, in conjunction with other improper
evidence,2" amounted to plain error that deprived the defendant
of a fair trial.2" In making this critical due process determination,
261. Id. at 842. The court stated.
"Circumstantial proof of a crime charged cannot be intermingled with circumstantial
proof of suspicious prior occurrences in such manner that it reacts as a psychological
factor with the result that the proof of the crime charged is used to bolster up the
theory or foster suspicion in the mind that the defendant must have committed the
prior act, and the conclusion that he must have committed the prior act is then used
in turn to strengthen the theory and induce the conclusion that he must also have
committed the crime charged. This is but a vicious circle."
Id. at 841 (quoting People v. Long, 86 Cal. Rptr. 590, 592 (Ct. App. 1970)).
262. See id. at 842. Inexplicably, although the court cited approvingly the due process
analysis of People v.Jackson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1967), it appears that the court failed to
apply the constitutional harmless error test to the case. See supra notes 244-45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing application of harmless error review for due process violation of forcing
defendant to prove another's innocence).
263. 525 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1994).
264. State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994) (quoting 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE § 5233 n.53.2 (Supp.
1994)). In Wiliams officers testified to general characteristics of "Amtrak" drug couriers,
including the facts that "they buy their tickets with cash, typically come from a so-called 'source'
city, such as Detroit[, and] typically use the dub car on the train." Id. By using this evidence,
wrote the court, the jury was "impliedly urged" to conclude that defendant knowingly possessed
the crack because she fit the profile. See id.
265. See id. at 549 (discussing errors at trial). The Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that
it found fault with the sum total of prosecutorial misconduct. See id. The court specifically
cited: (1) the use of inadmissable hearsay evidence related to the tip that led the detectives to
stop the defendant; (2) the admission of the drug courier profile; and (3) language in the
prosecutor's closing argument that had the affect of inviting the jury to question the motivation
behind the defendant's argument that she did not know the drugs were in her suitcase. See id.
266. See id. at 544. Interestingly, in United States v. Wison, 930 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991), this
precise issue was presented to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Wilson, the defendant
argued "that he was denied due process because the district court admitted drug trafficker
profile evidence as substantive evidence of his guilt." Id. at 617. The court found no due
process violation, holding that the profile evidence presented during the prosecution's case-in-
chief was used properly to rebut the defense of ignorance. See id. at 618. These contradictory
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the court considered the improper profile evidence "equally if not
more troubling" than the other errors.267
The holdings in these state court cases highlight the harm in
allowing profile evidence to be admitted at trial: it cannot be
challenged effectively. The profile, introduced as the "stereotype" of
a drug courier,21 sets the stage for comparison to the defendant's
conduct.269 Once the comparison is made in the juror's minds, the
defendant implicitly has become linked with the character of guilt.
The link is, in a practical sense, irrebuttable.
When profile characteristics are introduced to a jury, a picture is
drawn of the "typical" drug courier.27 °  These "typical" characteris-
tics are drawn from countless prior cases, involving countless prior
couriers. 271  Many varied characteristics have emerged over the
years 2  Because police officers are not required to apply any one
particular set of characteristics, any conduct inevitably will fit some
version of "the" profile.273 Consequently, when testimony eventually
opinions between the Minnesota Supreme Court and the federal appellate court sitting in that
district exemplify the conflict in this area of law and the need forjudicial review by the United
States Supreme Court.
267. Wiliams, 525 N.W.2d at 545.
268. See People v. Derello, 259 Cal. Rptr. 265, 270 (Ct. App. 1989) ("By themselves these
[profile) elements indicate no ongoing criminal activity but merely attempt to identify an
individual as a type of person who may engage in a criminal enterprise based upon stereotype
of drug courier appearance or behavior."); cf. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 397 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Arnold, CJ., dissenting) ("Use of race as a factor simply reinforces the kind of
stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles. When public officials begin to regard large
groups of citizens as presumptively criminal, this country is in a perilous situation indeed.").
269. When profile characteristics are introduced, for whatever purpose, the stereotypical
image of a drug courier is injected into the trial. When the defendant's conduct at the time of
the arrest is introduced, it inevitably will match at least some portion of the "typical" conduct
of a courier and a comparison is inherent. The fact that defendant's conduct will match some
version of the drug courier profile is the result of a lengthy and often contradictory list of
characteristics that courts have accepted as part of the drug courier profile. For example, some
courts have held that arrival at the destination city late at night is indicative of drug courier
activity, and others have felt similarly about arriving in the afternoon or early in the morning.
See Ruid Dng Courier Profiles See Everybody as Suspicious, 5 GRIM. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) 233, 234-35
(July 10, 1991) (providing thorough listing of similarly inconsistent and contradictory
characteristics).
270. See supra note 268 (citing cases acknowledging tendency of drug courier profiles to
create stereotypes).
271. SeeFloridav. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,525 n.6 (1983) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("A 'profile'
is, in effect, the collective or distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics
repeatedly seen in drug smugglers."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,547 n.1 (1980)
(noting that drug courier profile is an "informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought
to be typical of persons carrying illicit drugs").
272. See Fluid Drug Courier Profiles See Everybody as Suspicious, supra note 269, at 236.
273. See i. Given the numerous conflicting profiles noted in case law over the years, it is
safe to infer that police have a tendency to mix and match profile characteristics at will. See
Gregory L. Young, The Role of Stereotyping in the Development and Implementation of the D.E.A. Drug
Courier Profiles, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL REv. 331, 339 (1991). Professor Young explains:
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is presented on the defendant's specific conduct, it also, inevitably,
will fit the profile. When the jury is invited to compare the defendant
with untold numbers of presumably guilty drug couriers, they likewise
are invited to presume that the guilt of one proves the guilt of the
other.
This profile match, whether direct or indirect, creates an irrebutta-
ble inference that, because the defendant fit the profile of the
"typical" drug courier, he must be guilty. Logic dictates: If only the
guilty behave in a certain manner, and the defendant behaved in that
manner, the defendant is guilty. Therefore, the defendant must
disprove that only the guilty behave in that manner in order to prove
that he is not guilty. Inherent in this profile matching is the
government created compulsion on the defendant to defend not only
himself but the third persons making up the group character profile
evidence. 4  This places the defendant in an impossible posi-
tion275 because the "typical" courier is fiction. Forcing a defendant
to face such an irrebuttable inference, based on information that has
no proven validity, denies him the opportunity to mount a de-
fense.176  This situation is not harmless, and the practice of using
[T]he profiles have been said to be objectionable for their vagueness, because there
are no set limitations on the characteristics which may be used. Instead, the profiles
include a seemingly endless and everchanging set of criteria, which appear capable of
change to fit the traits of the suspects involved in each case.
274. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing similar statement made by court
in People v. Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Ct. App. 1992)).
275. This position is somewhat analogous to the "presumption" addressed in Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979), in which the Court found that ajury charge that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" denied
defendant due process of law because it alleviated the burden of the government to provide the
element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Although use of profile evidence does not rise
to the level of a presumption ordered by the court, it certainly places the defendant in a similar
situation as faras rebutting the evidence. Like the Sandstrompresumption, the inference created
by profile evidence goes to the element of intent and seemingly shifts the burden of proof to
the defendant to rebut the inference. The inference, however, is virtually irrebuttable.
276. The only real rebuttal available to a defendant claiming lack of knowledge in a drug
case would be to show that drug traffickers often use unknowing couriers to transport their
drugs. Ironically, this defense has been rejected by the courts. For example, in United States v.
Pereda-Aleman, No. 94-2197, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15162 (10th Cir. June 20, 1995), the
defendant subpoenaed a DEA agent to testify as an expert that "it is not at all unusual for the
driver of a vehicle containing contraband to have no knowledge of such contraband," and that
"it is common in smuggling operations to have a driver who is innocent." I& at *3 (citation
omitted). The court refused to allow the expert to testify, stating:
[The] proffered testimony would not have addressed 'specific facts' of [the
defendant's] case, but would instead have been in the form of an 'expert' hypothetical.
He simply would have testified that, as a general proposition, it is common for the
driver of a vehicle not to know drugs are in the car.... Such an opinion would not
have been helpful to a jury deciding whether [the defendant] personally had
knowledge.
THE AMERICAN UNVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:747
profile evidence, therefore, should be closely re-examined by the
courts.
CONCLUSION
The "War on Drugs" has had a far-reaching effect on American
society.27 7  In an attempt to stop the never-ending flow of illegal
narcotics from entering this country, law enforcement officers have
developed new techniques to aid them in their battle. The drug
courier profile is one "tool" that prosecutors have misused. It was
created as an investigative tool for detecting drug couriers. The
debate regarding the efficacy of the profile as an investigatory tool no
doubt will continue.
278
Now a more disturbing use of this "tool" has emerged. The profile
is being used at drug trials to prove guilt circumstantially. Presenta-
tion of the profile to the jury raises an irrebuttable inference that the
defendant matched the profile; therefore, he must have known he
possessed narcotics. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true. 9
Nonetheless, the inference reaches the jury.
Presentation of profile evidence adds little probative value to a case,
and, arguably, violates numerous evidentiary rules. Most alarming,
however, is the fact that it presents bad character evidence against the
accused before he has placed his character in issue. Federal courts
have failed to recognize the character implications of the profile,
although several recent state court decisions have made the analysis
and have concluded that the profile raises an impermissible bad
character inference.2tu If the defendant matches any factor of the
profile and the profile describes a typical drug courier, then the
Id. at *4-6; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, No. 94-4006, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36677, at
*9 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) (rejecting defendant's expert testimony that "blind mules" often
are used to transport drugs unknowingly on basis that it did not shed light on mental state of
.mule" but on practices of drug dealers and thus was useless to jury); United States v. Navarro-
Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court's refusal to allow testimony
about common ploy of drug smugglers to use unknowing couriers because it "added no
probative evidentiary value tending to prove or disprove the guilt or innocence of the
appellant").
277. See Paul F'mkelman, The Second Casualty of War Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1452 (1993) (concluding that "our Bill of Rights and our political freedom
will be ultimate casualties of our war on drugs");Jason A. Gillmer, Not United States v. Clary:
Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 499 (1995) (arguing that true victims
of war on drugs are racial minorities and U.S. Constitution).
278. See United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissenting)
("The 'drug courier profile' ... is so fluid that it can be used to justify designating anyone a
potential drug courier if the DEA agents so choose.").
279. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (relating incidents of false stops for narcotics
possession).
280. See supra notes 191-220 and accompanying text (examining Seventh Circuit case law).
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defendant must be a courier"' This inference is irrebuttable and
denies a defendant due process; the defendant is forced to prove the
innocence of the "typical" courier in order to prove his own inno-
cence. Such a situation is a vicious circle: The profile of a typical
courier proves the defendant's guilt as the defendant attempts to
prove typical couriers' innocence. 82
In light of the recent state court opinions, and because of the
conflict among the federal circuits, the Supreme Court should re-
evaluate the impact of drug courier profile evidence and provide a
definitive holding that will keep such evidence out of trials.
281. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (citing courts that have recognized this
unavoidable result).
282. See supra note 4. This situation is an impossibility because no statistical records are kept
of people fitting the profile who were found not to be drug couriers.
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